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ABSTRACT 
The Coal Seam Gas (CSG) and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) extraction and export industry 
forms a large part of the Australian Resource Sector, a driving force in the national 
economy. Given the nature of these industries, the vast majority of the development 
associated is located in rural and regional Australia. With these developments comes a 
significant increase in the volume of traffic, and the percentage of commercial vehicles 
expected to utilise the local road networks.  
The local infrastructure networks in these areas have often been designed and constructed 
to cater to low volumes of traffic and as such will usually consist of a pavement and 
formation only, with little in the way of drainage infrastructure. This existing asset class 
leaves these roads and associated road networks vulnerable to heavy rainfall events and 
flood events, with these roads often suffering significant damage and requiring a substantial 
amount of repair work be undertaken before the road is returned to the regular level of 
service. As a result these networks are extremely susceptible to damage and disruption 
during flood events.   
Following the significant damage caused to infrastructure networks in Queensland during 
the major Flood events of Tropical cyclones Tasha and Anthony in 2011, and Ostwald in 
2013, the resilience of transportation networks during and after major flood events has 
come into consideration. Many communities were isolated during the flood events and 
many assets were not returned to full service for periods of up to 2 years following the initial 
event. This disruption of the transportation network not only caused physical damage to the 
network, but is estimated to have cost the Queensland economy in excess of $15.7Billion. 
(Easdown, 2011). 
This research project aims to investigate the resilience to flooding of the local road network 
in the Wandoan Region of Queensland, Australia and the expected economic impacts on 
local CSG developments as a result of this level of resilience.  
To meet the research objectives of this project, a literature review was undertaken to 
determine existing frameworks for the quantification of network resilience. From this study 
the Networked Infrastructure Resilience Assessment (NIRA) Framework developed by 
(Omer, et al., 2013) was selected as the most appropriate and suitable method of analysis.  
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The NIRA framework was applied to model the resilience of the Western Downs Regional 
Council’s (WDRC) Wandoan West Road Network during a flood event of 2011 event 
magnitude, and assess the financial implications of this resilience on local Coal Seam Gas 
(CSG) Development in the area. This was undertaken by the application of forecast traffic 
data provided by CSG Developers, and historic damage information collected by WDRC in 
delivery of the 2011 flood damage recovery program.  
This initial analysis provided a benchmark level of performance against which the impact of 
proposed upgrades would be measured. This initial analysis identified three major links in 
the network as having the most potential for financial loss due to decreased level of 
performance following a flood event, with a cumulative cost per day to developers of 
$4,913.16.  
Using this analysis as a benchmark of existing network performance, a series of proposed 
upgrades were modelled by reducing the impact of recorded defects on the network in 
accordance with the proposed upgrade type. The impact of these upgrades was shown in a 
decreased cumulative cost per day of $1,985.43. This relatively minor saving per day has 
the potential to save CSG developers millions of dollars in lost production and increased 
travel costs over the extended period to full network recovery.  
From the comparison of these analyses, a number of conclusions regarding factors which 
may influence link resilience were drawn, and potential improvements and further work to 
the analysis were discussed. The analysis performed was determined to be a useful tool for 
identifying and quantifying vulnerable links in a road network, but collection of more detailed 
data would be required to have full confidence in the financial impacts calculated.   
This research project is supported by the University of Southern Queensland and the 
project supervisor, Trevor Drysdale.  
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INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND HISTORY 
Resilience in regards to infrastructure networks refers to the response of the network to 
severe and catastrophic shock, such as natural disasters and flood events, and the 
network’s ability to continue to meet an acceptable level of service during and after these 
events (Omer, et al., 2013). Such events have become more common recently as 
demonstrated by the significant flood events caused by Tropical Cyclones Tasha and 
Anthony in 2011, and Tropical Cyclone Ostwald in 2013. Both of these events resulted in 
significant flooding across the state of Queensland, and resulted in restoration and upgrade 
works to government infrastructure networks in excess of $13 Billion (Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority, 2014).  
As a result of this and other international events, much attention has been given to the 
investigation of resilience in infrastructure and how relevant techniques can be 
implemented at all stages of the asset life cycle to increase the network resilience to shocks 
and disruptions. In order to accomplish this, an understanding of the current level of 
resilience held by a network is necessary. 
There are currently a number of frameworks which aim to assess the level of resilience of a 
transport network. These include the Networked Infrastructure Resiliency Assessment 
(NIRA) frame work (Omer, et al., 2013), the framework proposed by (Bruneau, et al., 2003) 
for the quantitative assessment of the seismic resilience of communities, and the Three-
Stage Resilience Analysis Framework developed by (Ouyang, et al., 2012). 
In addition to the level of service provided by transport networks, it is also important to 
consider the many underlying economic factors which may indicate the priority of a 
particular road asset. These may include industries supplied by or dependant on the 
network, access of landowners to health and other services, and in the case of local 
government the asset owner’s responsibility to landowners and the public. 
As with any government organisation, intense scrutiny is placed upon local government 
when assessing and funding any capital works project. The use of public money and the 
constant consideration of political agenda requires all financial decisions be thoroughly 
evaluated and the most cost effective solution chosen. This constant review, coupled with a 
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vested public and economic interest in a fully functional transportation network means that 
while upgrades to the road network are essential, all options must be fully evaluated in 
order to ensure best value in the use of public funds.  
The Western Downs Regional Council’s (WDRC) local road network was severely affected 
by the 2011 and 2013 flood events. These events resulted in extensive damage to the 
unsealed roads portion of the network, as well as significantly damaging much of the 
drainage infrastructure in the region. This damage resulted in isolation of remote rural 
communities and severe restriction of local primary industries.  
The failure of these rural road networks during these flood events has highlighted the need 
for significant network upgrades in order to improve flood immunity and increase network 
flood resilience. However to accomplish this with the limited budget available to most rural 
Councils a thorough and detailed analysis of the current resilience of the network is 
required. From this the best value for money options can be selected for further 
investigation and possible inclusion in future capital works budgets. 
In addition to funding of upgrades with the use of Local Government’s capital works budget, 
significant external funding is available to Council in areas with a high amount of Coal 
Seam Gas development activity, such as the Wandoan region of the Western Downs 
Regional Council. This funding is provided by the resource company developing the area as 
a means of offsetting the impact that construction and operation traffic caused by the 
development would have on the existing road network. However, to gain access to this 
funding Council must be able to identify the benefits to the Resource Company provided by 
the proposed upgrades. An analysis of road network resilience, and the potential loss 
savings to the resource company in a flood event, would provide a clear justification for the 
full or partial funding of proposed road upgrades.  
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This project proposes to undertake an analysis of the WDRC Local Road Network in the 
Western Wandoan region, which is currently being developed by both QGC and Origin 
Energy for the extraction, compression, and transport of liquefied natural gas. As a direct 
result of this development, traffic volumes in this remote rural area have increased 
dramatically. Due to this increase WDRC has put conditions on both companies to 
significantly upgrade Bundi Road, which connects the surrounding region to the Jackson-
Wandoan Road and through this the Warrego highway which links southeast Queensland 
to Brisbane.  
It is proposed through the analysis of the existing network, to determine the resilience of 
Bundi Road and surrounding roads to flood events, and through this the financial 
implications a disruption to this network would have on the CSG industry development in 
the area. From this analysis a series of recommended road upgrades would be modelled, 
and the network reanalysed with these proposed upgrades in place. This will provide a 
difference in expected financial loss during a flood event, which may then be compared to 
the estimated cost of the proposed upgrades in order to determine the value for money 
posed by construction of these flood mitigation measures.  
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OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION 
This paper contains six chapters which broadly define the different section of this research 
project. A summary of these is given below.  
Introduction A brief introduction to the consideration of infrastructure resilience, a 
summary of recent flood events and the need to consider resilience to flooding 
developed from this, and the specific considerations relating to infrastructure 
resilience in the West Wandoan region of the Western Downs Regional Council 
area.  
Literature Review A review of the existing literature regarding the study and 
evaluation of a network’s resilience to disruptions, an overview of the existing 
condition of the West Wandoan road network, and an overview of the impacts of 
recent flood events on this network.  
Methodology A detailed investigation into the methodology required to meet the 
report objectives, including data collection and review techniques, boundary 
conditions for selection of data, an assessment of project risks, identification of 
required resources, and the project schedule. 
Network Analysis The development of the network model from the collected asset 
data, and analysis of this network using historic flood recovery data collected. A 
second iteration will then be completed to analyse potential benefits and savings due 
to a series of proposed upgrades.  
Discussion Comparison of the network analysis results to identify trends in the data, 
and draw conclusions based on correlations between the virtual network and the 
physical network.  
Conclusions Review of the results if the network analysis as well as the proposed 
upgrades will identify areas of concern in the existing network which may benefit the 
network as a whole by upgrade.  
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1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Resilience in regards to infrastructure networks refers to the response of the network to 
severe and catastrophic shock, such as natural disasters and flood events, and the 
network’s ability to continue to meet an acceptable level of service during and after these 
events (Omer, et al., 2013). Such events have become more common recently as 
demonstrated by the significant flood events caused by Tropical Cyclone Anthony and 
Tasha in October 2010 and February 2011, and Tropical Cyclone Ostwald in 2013. Both of 
these events resulted in significant flooding across the state of Queensland, and resulted in 
restoration and upgrade works to government infrastructure networks in excess of $13 
Billion (Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014).  
As a result of this and other international events, much attention has been given to the 
investigation of resilience in infrastructure and how relevant techniques can be 
implemented at all stages of the asset life cycle to increase the network resilience to shocks 
and disruptions. In order to accomplish this, an understanding of the current level of 
resilience held by a network is necessary. 
1.2 RESILIENCE AND THE RELEVANCE TO THE MODERN WORLD 
Due to the significant network disruption and cost associated with recovery caused by 
natural disasters and acts of terrorism in the modern world, much focus has been given to 
enhancing the ability of these networks to function adequately and recovery quickly from 
these disruptions.  
(Bruneau, et al., 2003) defines community seismic resilience as “the ability of social units 
(e.g. organisations, communities) to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters when 
they occur, and carry out recovery activities in ways that minimise social disruption and 
mitigate the effects of future earthquakes. While (Ouyang, et al., 2012) defines resilience as 
the joint ability of infrastructure systems to resists (prevent and withstand) any possible 
hazards, absorb the initial damage, and recover to normal operation. For the purposes of 
this paper, resilience in regards to regional transportation networks will be defined as the 
ability of the network to reduce the occurrence of disruptive events, minimise the network 
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disruption due to these events, and recover to an adequate level of service in a reasonable 
and effective timeframe following these event.  
Resiliency in urban areas may mean a disruption in the level of service provided to road 
users, while in a regional or remote area, a disruption may mean isolation from necessary 
services for short or long periods of time. The primary reason for this is the lower class of 
asset commonly found in these regional areas. The lower class of asset is justified due to 
the cost of construction compared to the number of expected users. The compromise in this 
reduced minimum level of service is the increased vulnerability of these roads to flood and 
heavy rainfall events. 
With Construction traffic for Phase 2 QGC developments in the Wandoan Area expected to 
be greatly in access of the low traffic volumes the roads usually cater too, the potential for 
loss due to a flood event is substantially higher, drawing attention to the resiliency or lack 
there of, of this network to flood events.   
1.3 THE WANDOAN WEST ROAD NETWORK 
This section of the literature review is intended to give a brief overview of the Wandoan 
West Road Network, particularly the area in the region of the proposed and existing CSG 
developments. This summary will provide an understanding of the current state of the road 
network in this area, the current level of service offered, and the susceptibility of the 
network to flood events.  
1.3.1 Network Overview and Boundary 
The Wandoan Local Road Network consists of approximately 518.1km of road, of which 
199.8km is sealed and 318.3km unsealed (Moloney Systems, 2011). Due to the scarcity of 
quality granular pavement materials in the local area, this proportion of sealed to unsealed 
roads is higher than would be expected in most regional areas, as the cost to supply 
pavement material often means that sealing a road provided lower whole of life costs than 
gravel resheeting.  
For the purpose of this paper, the network to the west of Wandoan, north of Bundi Road, 
and east of the Roma-Taroom Road will be considered. This portion of the road network will 
be referred to as the Wandoan West Road Network (WWRN). This portion of the network 
can be seen in figure 1.1 below. This image is extracted from Appendix A – Wandoan Rural 
Surface Type. 
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Figure 1.1 - Wandoan West Road Network extents 
These network extents were chosen for the primary reason being that this area, specifically 
the south-western section, is the major centre for CSG development in the Wandoan Area 
and because of this is the area planned for major upgrades of the road network. This 
provided the motive for selecting the region, while the network boundary was chosen as it 
encompasses the area between three major arterial roads, being Roma-Taroom Road to 
the west, Jackson-Wandoan Road to the south, and the Leichardt Highway to the east. 
These three roads link the major population centres of the region, as well as linking the 
region to the Warrego Highway which provides access to south-east Queensland, and the 
cities of Toowoomba and Brisbane. Due to this the majority of labour, plant, and materials 
to be used in all development in the area will use one of these roads to access the region. 
Effectively, the WWRN shown encompasses a subsection of the network with these three 
arterial roads providing access to the larger network.  
1.3.2 Current Network Conditions 
As shown in Appendix A – Wandoan Rural Surface Type, and the extra figure 1.1, much of 
the key sections of the WWRN are sealed bitumen surfaces (shown in blue), with links 
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between these sealed roads often being unsealed (shown in brown), or formation only 
(shown in green) meaning the road is formed of insitu material only. 
1.3.2.1 Existing Road Surface Types 
Of the sealed sections of road, the bitumen seal width ranges between 4 and 8 meters, 
depending on the traffic volume and composition, and road hierarchy. A seal width of 4 
meters is suitable for use by a single vehicle at a time only, with approaching traffic being 
forced to partially leave the sealed surface in order to pass safely. This causes wearing of 
the road shoulder, and in wet weather conditions can prove hazardous to traffic, particularly 
heavy commercial vehicles which can cause severe deformation of the road shoulder under 
these conditions. Figure 1.2 below illustrates well typical shoulder damage to a sealed road 
due to trafficking of unsealed shoulders during wet weather. 
 
Figure 1.2 – Example of a typical rural road with sealed surface of 6 meter width (Bungaban Road, Wandoan) 
The unsealed roads in the Wandoan Road Network typically have a pavement width of 5 to 
6 meters. The pavement is constructed of a crushed granular material, typical to the region 
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is crushed laterite, and is intended to provide a high strength trafficable surface without the 
additional construction cost of a bitumen seal. These roads typically experience only local 
traffic of low volume, such as that shown of the rural feeder in WDRC Standard Drawing for 
Roads in Appendix E, and are often capable of an operating speed of between 80 and 
100km/h dependant on road geometry. An extract of this is shown below. These unsealed 
roads require more frequent maintenance than sealed roads, often requiring grading 
annually or bi-annually, and requiring a resheet of gravel material every 15 years (Moloney 
Systems, 2011). These roads will be trafficable to a reasonable extent in periods of wet 
weather, though may become slippery requiring a reduction in operating speed. Often 
heavy vehicles will be unable to traffic these roads during extended periods of wet weather, 
or if trafficking these roads, will often cause significant damage to the road due to 
deformation and rutting of the pavement.   
 
Figure 1.3 - Extract Appendix E, Typical Road Cross Sections (WDRC) 
The figure 1.4 below is an excellent illustration of the potential vulnerabilities of a pavement 
only road. This photo of Old Chinchilla Road was taken during delivery of 2013 Flood 
Damage restoration works. Note the road surface seems to be in good condition and 
suitable for the traffic volume of the road, however in the invert shown approximately half 
way along this section, moisture has penetrated and weakened the pavement resulting in 
failure. The darker material would indicate that the insitu subgrade has been forced though 
the pavement contaminating the pavement material, and as such the entire damage section 
will require pavement replacement with new material.  
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Figure 1.4 - Example of Typical Unsealed pavement only road for the Wandoan Region (Old Chinchilla Rd, Guluguba) 
Formation only roads are typically minor roads which provide access only to local 
landowners, of which there are few. For example, Burradoo Road to the west of the WWRN 
recorded a total AADT of 6 vehicles per day at last count in 2005 (Western Downs Regional 
Council, 2009). These formation only roads often don’t service enough of the community to 
warrant the expenditure of a gravel pavement, and as such provide only an absolute 
minimum level of service. These roads often require minimal maintenance due to the low 
traffic volumes experienced, but are often untrafficable under wet conditions.  
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Figure 1.5 – Example of typical formation only road, Wandoan (Perretts Rd, Bundi) 
Figure 1.5 shows a typical formation only road operating well under dry conditions. 
Evidence of wheel rutting indicates the low tolerance of these formation only roads to traffic 
during wet weather events. 
1.3.2.2 Existing Drainage Structures 
Of the existing drainage structures in the Wandoan Road Network, Bridges constitute 
approximately half of all major flow crossings. Of the existing bridges in the Wandoan 
Region, the majority are timber pile and girder bridges. These bridges prove common due 
to the relative low cost to construct at the time of construction. Constructed in the 1960’s or 
1970’s, labour and hardwood timber were both inexpensive and plentiful resources in the 
region, and because of this and the relative unavailability of concrete, the majority of the 
drainage structures in the area were constructed in this manner. These bridges were often 
constructed to a for a T44 maximum design vehicle, indicating a maximum load of 44 
tonnes. As such these bridges are unideal for use by the modern road trains. There are a 
number of timber bridges in the WWRN, located on Bundi, Yeovil, Booral, and Grosmont 
Roads.  
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Figure 1.6 - Timber Bridge – Bundi Road, Wandoan 
The alternative to timber bridges at major creek crossings in the Wandoan Area are large 
Reinforce Concrete Box Culverts (RCBC). The majority of these units were constructed of 
cast insitu reinforced concrete and prove more durable and suitable to modern vehicles 
than the timber bridges of the region. However, due to their nature, these culverts are 
constructed at low level crossings only, meaning that these structures are often inundated 
and submerged during large flows. During minor to moderate flows however these 
structures provide a safe and trafficable means of crossing for traffic.  
 
Figure 1.7 - Large Cast Insitu Cuvlert 
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At minor crossings or areas where water will frequently cross a road, the most common 
treatments are small culverts, similar to the above but of hydraulic area ≤3m², or concrete 
floodways. Concrete floodways are often used in areas where fast moving flows will cross a 
road, or where slow flows will inundate the road for extended periods of time. These 
floodways essentially do not provide any flood immunity to a road during the time of the 
event, but provide a much more durable asset which is less prone to the failures that would 
be experienced if a sealed or unsealed granular pavement road was constructed in the 
same area.  
 
Figure 1.8 - Concrete Floodway – Bundi Road, Wandoan 
1.3.2.3 Existing Traffic Volume 
As shown by Appendix 2 – Historic Traffic Volumes Wandoan Rural, the historic traffic 
volumes for Bundi Road was 117 vehicles per day, with 36% Heavy Vehicles in January 
2009. Considering the road Hierarchy in the network, as shown in Appendix 3 – Wandoan 
Rural Road Hierarchy, this count is modest. The road status as a Rural Collector refers to 
its role in the network of collecting all traffic in the Eastern Wandoan Area and transporting 
this to the Rural Arterial roads of Jackson-Wandoan road and the Leichardt Highway, which 
run between major population centres.  
1.3.3 Forecast Network Conditions 
The major impact to WWRN road conditions due to CSG developments in the region is a 
significant increase in traffic volume on these local roads. Data provided to the Snowy 
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Mountains Engineering Corporation (SMEC) by QGC indicate and expected construction 
traffic of 433 vehicles per day on average, for a period of 1.5 years (SMEC, 2014). This 
means an increase in AADT of 370% during this construction period, and an increase of 
45.2% due to operational traffic over the following 8 years. This traffic data is shown below 
in figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 1.9 - Design Traffic Summary 
While this increase in traffic does not directly affect the resiliency of the Wandoan West 
Road Network, it does dramatically increase the commercial and community dependency 
on the network, as well as substantially increasing the repercussions of a network failure. 
This concept is expressed in figure 1.2, using the principles proposed by (Omer, et al., 
2013) as detailed in section 11 of this chapter in terms of travel time for road users.  
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Figure 1.10 Increased consequences of network failure due to increased traffic volume 
As shown above, an increase in traffic volume is directly proportional to increases in the 
measures of reduced network performance. To analyse this further, assuming an hourly 
rate per road user of $35/hr, this decrease in network performance could be expressed as 
an additional cost to the local community of $14,745.50. In order to reduce the impact of 
this disruption, additional measures would be required which either reduce the severity of 
the disruption (R value), or reduce the duration of the disruption (D value).  
Though a gross oversimplification of the NIRA Framework developed by (Omer, et al., 
2013), figure 1.2 illustrates well the concept of increased potential for loss, or increased 
consequence of road network failure due to increased traffic volume.  
This increased potential for loss is a currently developing issue in the Wandoan West Road 
Network. This paper aims to investigate this increased potential for loss due to network 
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resilience, and the financial implications this would have for all road users, particularly road 
traffic involved in the development of CSG facilities in the area.  
To offset the dramatic increases in traffic volume, QGC and Origin Energy are in the 
process of constructing a number of upgrades to the WWRN. These proposed and in 
process upgrades will be detailed and analysed in the Analysis chapter of this report.  
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1.4 IMPACTS OF SIGNIFICANT FLOOD EVENTS 
1.4.1 Past Flood Events 
WDRC experienced significant network damage and disruption in the years 2010-11, and 
2013 due to Tropical Cyclones Tasha and Anthony from November 20 to February 2011, 
and Tropical Cyclone Ostwald in 2013. These events can be identified in the chart below 
created from BOM historic rainfall data for station 35014 located at the Wandoan Post 
Office (Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology, 2015). 
  
Figure 1.11 - Cumulative monthly Rainfall Data (Wandoan Post Office) 2010-2014 (Australian Government Bureau of 
Meteorology, 2015) 
Note that due to a lack of records regarding road closure durations and extents during both 
of these events, durations for road closures have been determined by interview with WDRC 
Staff present in the area during the time of the events, and involved in the subsequent 
emergent and restoration works.  
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1.4.1.1 2011 Event – Tropical Cyclones Tasha and Anthony November 2010 – 
February 2011 
Due to widespread torrential rain caused by Category 1 Cyclone Tasha in December 2010, 
and Category 2 Cyclone Anthony in January 2011, large swathes of the Western Downs 
Regional Council road network were inundated as tributaries of the Fitzroy River Basin 
reached and exceeded their natural capacity. This flooding of the Fitzroy Basin was 
determined to be a 1% AEP Event, meaning that the probability of a rainfall event of this 
magnitude is approximately an average of once every 100 years.  
This widespread flooding caused massive disruption to the Wandoan Road Network, with 
all bridges in the region being submerged for a period of 2 days, with some low lying 
bridges remaining submerged for up to 2 weeks. Following floodwaters receding these 
roads became trafficable, though many were significantly damaged due to flow across the 
road way, or damage to drainage structures. Further to this, many of the roads that weren’t 
damaged outright by inundation were weakened due to moisture penetration and saturation 
of the granular pavement. This weakening of the road resulted in damage once exposed to 
traffic loads, resulting in potholes, pavement deformation, and damage to the bitumen seal, 
and rutting.  
The rectification of this work was undertaken in two distinct stages. The emergency 
restoration work, referred to as emergent work, and the restoration of non-hazardous 
defects. The emergent work period takes place immediately following the flood event, with 
works identified as dangerous and in need of emergency repair by WDRC staff, and being 
immediately repaired dependant on resources. The restoration work period can occur much 
later, due the time taken for the asset owner (WDRC) to gather data and submit claims to 
the QRA, and the time taken for the QRA to assess the claim to determine eligibility. Many 
local councils will not proceed with restoration work until given approval for the eligibility of 
the work by QRA. This is to minimise the risk to council of additional expenditure, should 
the work be completed and then determined to be non-eligible.  
The figure 1.12 demonstrates the extent of the flooding due to the 1% AEP event 
associated with Cyclones Tasha and Anthony.  
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Figure 1.12 - 1% AEP Event footprint - Fitzroy Basin (Department of Natural Resources and Mines, 2015) 
The estimated cost to repair this damage in the WWRN alone was $1,817,000. $9,492,000 
for the entire Wandoan Region, and $67,183,000 for the entire Western Downs Regional 
Council Area (Western Downs Regional Council, 2011).  
In addition to the enormous financial cost of reconstructing the damaged network, there 
were unestimated losses to the community due to the network operating at sub-optimal 
performance for the duration of restoration works. As discussed earlier, the emergent works 
phase restored the network to a minimum acceptable level of safety in a matter of weeks, 
however the restoration phase of this reconstruction was in operation until June of 2013, 
meaning the network was operating below the regular performance level for a period of 2.5 
years.  
1.4.1.2 2013 Event – Tropical Cyclone Ostwald 2013 
In similar circumstance to the widespread flooding of 2011 caused by tropical cyclones 
Tasha and Anthony, major flooding to the Wandoan Road Network was caused in January 
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2013 by torrential rain accompanying the landfall of Category 1 Tropical Cyclone Ostwald. 
This event was less severe than the preceding 2011 event as shown in figure 1.11, 
however this event still caused significant and widespread damage and disruption to the 
Wandoan Road Network.  
Figure 1.13 - Historic Daily Rainfall (2010-2014) Wandoan Post Office (Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology, 
2015) 
Figure 1.13 better illustrates the intensity of the 2013 TC Ostwald Flood Event in the 
Wandoan Region. While the total cumulative value for the month is not as high as the 2011 
event as indicated by figure 1.11, the peak daily rainfall is 87% of the 2011 peak daily 
rainfall, and this rainfall was consistent over two consecutive days during the 2013 Event. 
The result is a flood event of similar severity, but of shorter duration and equally as capable 
of causing widespread damage to the local infrastructure networks. 
The total cost for reconstruction and recovery of the network in the Wandoan Area was 
estimated at $3,352,000 for reconstruction works, and $513,000 for emergent works. This 
amounted to a total estimated recovery cost of $3,865,000.  
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The restoration works for this event were delivered in a similar manner to the 2011 flood 
damage event, in two distinct phases: the emergent works phase, and the restoration 
phase. The result of this is the most dangerous or disruptive defects to the network were 
restored to a minimum level of service in a short timeframe following the event, but the bulk 
of the defects (86.7% as a proportion of value of work) were delivered gradually over a 2.5 
year period.  
1.4.2 Consequences and reduced level of service 
1.4.2.1 Short Term Network Disruption 
Short Term Network Disruption in regards to the 2010-11 and 2013 Flood Events detailed, 
refers to disruptions to the network during the flood event itself. These short term 
disruptions were manifested primarily in the inundation and untraffickibility of key bridges for 
extended periods of time due to abnormally high flood water levels.  
A number of bridges were inundated during the 2011 Flood Event for a period of 48 hours 
(Chown & Harth, 2015) including structures on all major creeks in the area, including: Horse 
Creek, Juandah Creek, Wooleebee Creek, Roche Creek, Eurombah Creek, and Bungaban 
Creek. The location of these structure is shown below in figure 1.14. The importance of 
these structures to maintaining network function is clearly shown, with the entire WWRN 
and surrounding area isolated should these bridges not be functional. These images are 
generated using Google Earth and the Queensland Globe (Queensland Government, 
2015). 
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Figure 1.14 - Bridge Locations - WWRN (Google Earth, 2015) 
These disruptions will be restored to service naturally with the receding of floodwaters to 
allow trafficability of these structures. Further to this most structures will be inspected to 
ensure no compromising damage to the structure has occurred prior to allowing traffic to 
use the structure.  
1.4.2.2 Long Term Network Disruption 
Long Term Network Disruptions refers to the damage to the network which reduces the 
level of network performance until the defect is repaired. These disruptions become 
apparent following the flood event and the natural restoration of the short term disruptions 
(bridges). These disruptions are the result of various types of damage to road pavement, 
surfacing, or drainage structures.  
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Damages to sealed pavements constituted approximately $2,976,000 worth of the 
restoration cost of the 2011 Floods to the Wandoan Region. This is 31% of the total 
reconstruction value. The most common of these defects can be broadly defined as 
damage to sealed pavement, damage to bitumen seal, and damage to unsealed shoulder. 
This is a very vague and broad generalisation of defects to a sealed road, but will prove 
sufficient for description of flood damage to sealed roads in the WWRN. Examples of these 
defects are shown below in figure 1.15. These defects are most commonly repaired by 
reconstruction of the damaged pavement and application of a new bitumen seal to the 
reconstructed pavement.  
Figure 1.15 - Examples of Pavement deformation due to moisture ingress including damage to bitumen seal (right) and 
damage to the unsealed shoulder (Left) 
Damages to Unsealed Pavement constituted 38% of the overall cost of reconstruction of 
the 2011 Flood Event in the Wandoan region, with an estimated repair cost of $3,645,000. 
Damage to unsealed roads was most commonly experienced as deformation of saturated 
pavement material, and loss or scouring of pavement material due to overland flow or 
inundation. The repair treatment in both cases usually constitutes resheeting of the gravel 
pavement with new pavement material, or compaction and profiling of the existing material 
to restore to geometry and crossfall. These defects are illustrated in figure 1.16.  
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Figure 1.16 - Deformation of Saturated Pavement (left) and scouring and loss of pavement materials due to overland flow 
(right) 
Damage to formation only roads is also common not only after major flood events, but any 
form of significant rainfall. Being a lower class of asset, these roads are more easily 
damaged by wet weather, but are also more easily restored, usually requiring only 
regrading of the road to restore to the previous level of service. A significant amount of 
formation grading was required to restore formation only roads to service following both 
flood events. In particular, the lower order roads to the west of the Wandoan District.  
Figure 1.17 - Damage to Formation Only road - Perretts Road Wandoan 
As expected in flood events of significantly high magnitude, drainage structures are 
required to accommodate weather flows far greater than their design capacity, and as a 
result of this often sustain damage. This damage can take the form of undermining or 
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scouring on the downstream side of the structure due to high velocity flow, separation of 
reinforced concrete pipe (RCP) components, build-up of silt or debris, or inundation or 
damage to the surrounding road.  
Figure 1.18 - Scouring on downstream side of concrete floodway due to high velocity flow, severe damage to RCP units 
due to hydraulic pressure build-up caused by insufficient capacity 
Each of these defects will affect the performance of a road network differently according to 
location, severity, and road hierarchy and usage. All defects as documented in the recovery 
of the 2011 Flood Event in the WWRN will be considered individually in order to determine 
the impact that defect would have on the capacity of the particular road segment or network 
link. From this the reduction in network capacity and performance may be determined, and 
the network resilience to a flood event of Q100 magnitude, as experienced as a result of TC 
Tasha and Anthony, calculated and quantified.  
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1.5 EXISTING FRAMEWORKS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF NETWORK 
RESILIENCE 
There are currently a number of frameworks which aim to assess the level of resilience of a 
transport network. These include the Networked Infrastructure Resiliency Assessment 
(NIRA) frame work (Omer, et al., 2013), the framework proposed by (Bruneau, et al., 2003) 
for the quantitative assessment of the seismic resilience of communities, a risk based 
approach to resilience calculation as provided by (Zoubir, 2013), and the Three-Stage 
Resilience Analysis Framework developed by (Ouyang, et al., 2012). 
In addition to the level of service provided by transport networks, it is also important to 
consider the many underlying economic factors which may indicate the priority of a 
particular road asset. These may include industries supplied or dependant on the network, 
access of landowners to health and other services, and in the case of local government, the 
asset owner’s responsibility to landowners and the public. An example of the importance of 
this; the estimated economic losses caused due to the 2011 flood event are estimated to be 
between $5bn and $6bn (Uren, 2011). 
There are a number of frameworks which have been developed and proposed as means of 
quantifying and assessing the level of resilience of an infrastructure network. Though not all 
of these frameworks apply directly to transport infrastructure networks, the general 
principles of most can be applied to such. A number of these frameworks will be 
investigated below with the aim of determining the framework most suited to the network 
being analysed, and the framework which will produce the most relevant and meaningful 
results.  
1.5.1 A framework to Quantitatively Assess and Enhance the Seismic 
Resilience of Communities  
A Framework to Quantitatively Assess and Enhance the Seismic Resilience of 
Communities was authored by (Bruneau, et al., 2003) and published in Volume 19, No. 4 of 
the Journal; Earthquake Spectra.  
This paper presents a conceptual framework to be used in analysing the current resilience 
of communities to seismic disruptions, and developing quantitative measures of resilience 
that may then be used to identify possible methods or practises for enhancing this 
resilience. At the time of publishing there had been many previous investigations into 
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seismic resilience. However, the majority of this research has been focused on developing 
new technologies or knowledge to increase seismic resilience, being a qualitative 
assessment of the concept. Due to this there was little understanding of the factors 
contributing to resilience, or the systematic process required to assess a community’s 
current level of resilience. This quantitative approach is necessary to better implement and 
identify the need for those technologies and knowledge discussed earlier.  
1.5.1.1 General Measures of Resilience 
(Bruneau, et al., 2003) defines community seismic resilience as “the ability of social units 
(e.g. organisations, communities) to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters when 
they occur, and carry out recovery activities in ways that minimise social disruption and 
mitigate the effects of future earthquakes. This definition provides clear objectives for the 
framework, being that any actions to enhance the resilience of the community should 
increase the probability of core services functioning during a disruption. Core services 
would include infrastructure, such as water supply or electricity, or community services such 
as health care. If these services are able to function during disruptions, the severity and 
duration of the consequences of this disruption is likely to be significantly reduced.  
1.5.1.2 Concept and Quantification of Resilience 
(Bruneau, et al., 2003) states that a resilient system is one which reduces the chances of a 
disruption or shock, has increased capacity to absorb the shock without diminishing 
performance to an unacceptable level, and has the ability to recover quickly after a shock. 
To summarise, a resilient system shows: 
1. Reduced failure probabilities 
2. Reduced consequences from failures 
3. Reduced Time to Recovery 
These concepts are illustrated in the below figure from (Bruneau, et al., 2003); 
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Figure 1.19 - Measure of Seismic Resilience - conceptual definition (Bruneau, et al., 2003) 
This illustration defines the quality of infrastructure Q(t) as a percentage of performance 
capacity at any point in time (t), where 0% would indicate a complete lack of service and 
100% would indicate no degradation in service from design levels.  
As shown in Figure 1, disruptions or shocks cause a loss of service which is then repaired 
to design capacity over time. This diminished performance over time then represents the 
loss of resilience for that specific event. This can be expressed by the integral shown in 
Equation 1. 
𝑅 =  ∫ [
𝑡1
𝑡0
1 − 𝑄(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 
Equation 1 - Loss of Resilience (R) (Bruneau, et al., 2003) 
(Bruneau, et al., 2003) also goes on to address Dimensions of Resilience being technical, 
organisational, social, and economic. This includes illustrating the interdependency of many 
different systems to contribute to overall community resilience. While this investigation is 
relevant to the study of community resilience as a whole, it is not relevant to the scope of 
this research paper which will focus on a single road network only. As such this will not be 
elaborated further in this paper.  
1.5.1.3 Framework Method and Concept 
As discussed earlier, (Bruneau, et al., 2003) aims to propose a framework which will be 
able to measure the resilience of a community and quantify this level of resilience to allow 
the value to be measured against an established scale. In order to effectively measure the 
resilience of the community, this framework is required to analyse the ability of an 
infrastructure system to service a community prior to a disruption, and during a disruption. 
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Considering these requirements (Bruneau, et al., 2003) has developed a series of 
performance measures (Figure 1.20) to be used in the assessment of an existing system. 
These measures are then to be used in conjunction with a Systems Diagram (Figure 1.21) 
in order to determine the resilience of a community and identify strategies for enhancing 
this resilience.  
Figure 1.20 - Resilience Performance Measures (Bruneau, et al., 2003) 
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Figure 1.21 - System Diagram for Evaluation of System Resilience (Bruneau, et al., 2003) 
1.5.1.4 Evaluation of Framework and Suitability  
While (Bruneau, et al., 2003) provides valuable and thought provoking prose on the concept 
of resilience in infrastructure systems, the framework provided does not quantify, or provide 
the means of quantifying the losses to the community due to a network disruption to a detail 
significant enough to justify private or public expenditure on the enhancement of these 
networks.  
In order to justify local government expenditure, or apply for additional state government 
funding, a clear financial benefit will need to be demonstrated to support the proposed 
upgrade to the Wandoan West Road Network. This financial benefit will need to be shown 
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in terms of reduced maintenance or recovery costs, or if funding is to be provided by the 
private sector, clear cost savings to the companies to fund the upgrades should the 
upgrades be implemented.  
The features of a resilient system given by (Bruneau, et al., 2003) provide a useful 
benchmark for high-level analysis of any system, including the Wandoan West Road 
Network. These features are: 
 Reduced failure probabilities 
 Reduced consequences from failures 
 Reduced time to recovery 
These features may be used as effective screening criteria for any proposed upgrades, in 
order to determine that the proposed upgrade would significantly enhance the resilience of 
the road network if constructed.  
Another concept discussed by (Bruneau, et al., 2003) was the Dimensions of Resilience, 
specifically the properties of a resilient system described as: 
 Robustness: strength, or the ability of elements, systems, and other units of analysis 
to withstand a given level of stress or demand without suffering degradation or loss 
of function 
 Redundancy: the extent to which elements, systems, or other units of analysis exist 
that are substitutable, i.e., capable of satisfying functional requirements in the event 
of disruption, degradation, or loss of functionality 
 Resourcefulness: the capacity to identify problems, establish priorities, and mobilize 
resources when conditions exist that threaten to disrupt some element, system, or 
other unit of analysis; resourcefulness can be further conceptualized as consisting of 
the ability to apply material (i.e., monetary, physical, technological, and 
informational) and human resources to meet established priorities and achieve goals 
 Rapidity: the capacity to meet priorities and achieve goals in a timely manner in 
order to contain losses and avoid future disruption 
Similarly to the features of a resilient system discussed above, the above properties of a 
resilient system will prove valuable as high level screening criteria when evaluating any 
proposed resiliency enhancing upgrades to the network. These properties also provide a 
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sounds foundation in understanding the concept of resilience, and defining a resilient 
system. 
In summary, the framework proposed by (Bruneau, et al., 2003) provides a comprehensive 
understanding of the fundamentals of a resilient system, but lacks the specific detail 
required should the analysis be required as justification of government expenditure. This is 
not a shortcoming of the framework as the intent of the authors and creators was to create 
a general framework for assessing the resilience of all systems vital to the overall resiliency 
of the community, and with this broad scope a detailed analysis is not possible. The 
framework would provide valuable when evaluating and developing potential network 
upgrades, as the analysis undertaken seems more to focus on identifying weaknesses in 
the network, as opposed to quantifying the network resilience into finite data.  
1.5.2 A three-stage resilience analysis framework for urban infrastructure 
systems 
The paper A three-stage resilience analysis framework for urban infrastructure systems by 
(Ouyang, et al., 2012), was published in Volume 36 and 37 of the journal Structural Safety.  
This article builds on existing literature to propose a new multi-stage framework for the 
analysis of infrastructure system resilience. At each stage (Ouyang, et al., 2012) identifies 
possible strategies for the enhancement of the system resilience, before combining the 
analysis of each stage to determine an Annual Resilience value for the network. The 
framework proposed effectively elaborates on and combines existing modelling of 
cascading failures of infrastructure systems, and modelling of the systems restoration 
processes to provide a full consideration of the overall resilience of an infrastructure 
system.  
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework (Ouyang, et al., 2012) 
undertakes an analysis of the power transmission grid in Harris County, Texas, USA. This 
analysis is then compared to the analysis of several hypothetical models with resilience 
enhancing upgrades. The results of this successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of the 
proposed upgrades, as the calculation of the model’s Annual Resilience (AR) value 
provided a clear and distinct metric for the comparison of the models and their respective 
impacts on overall system resilience.  
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1.5.2.1 Quantification and Concept of Resilience 
As the proposed framework is intended for the analysis of a variety of infrastructure 
systems, (Ouyang, et al., 2012) investigates existing definitions from a number specialised 
authorities in order to develop a universal conceptual definition of resilience for the 
purposes of the paper. These definitions applied to the fields of Biology, Information and 
Systems Engineering, Homeland Security, Earthquake Engineering Research, and others. 
Following this (Ouyang, et al., 2012) defines resilience as the joint ability of infrastructure 
systems to resists (prevent and withstand) any possible hazards, absorb the initial damage, 
and recover to normal operation. 
Similar to (Bruneau, et al., 2003), (Ouyang, et al., 2012) defines the resilience of a system 
as the system performance during the three distinct periods of a system disruption; before 
the event (the system ability to resist and prevent disruption), during the event (the system 
ability to reduce and minimise the severity of a disruptive event), and after an event (the 
ability of the system to recovery from an event and return to a regular level of service).  
1.5.2.2 Framework Concept 
The framework proposed for analysis of urban infrastructure systems, was proposed to 
address gaps in the existing literature. Existing research focused on specific disruptive 
events, or single hazards to the system, and not considering the possibility of multiple 
events occurring at once. These analyses also did not account for the resilience of the 
system itself, in the system capacity to resist and absorb the disruptions caused by the 
event, and recover following.  
Identifying these gaps in the existing literature, (Ouyang, et al., 2012) proposes a 
framework which analyses the system using resilience parameters at each of the three 
stages to determine an overall Annual Resilience (AR) metric. An illustration of this concept 
provided by (Ouyang, et al., 2012) is shown in figure 4. 
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Figure 1.22 - Performance Response curve of an infrastructure system (Ouyang, et al., 2012) 
This illustration bears comparison to (Bruneau, et al., 2003) conceptual definition of Seismic 
Resilience. The two illustrations are shown in Figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 1.23 - M. Ouyang et al. Performance Response Curve, Bruneau et al. Definition of seismic resilience. (Bruneau, et 
al., 2003) (Ouyang, et al., 2012) 
From the comparison of these two illustrations, it is clear to see the same general concepts 
or stages of resilient infrastructure performance used in each model. Each model uses the 
concept of system performance over time as the foundation for the models developed, 
however (Ouyang, et al., 2012) shows a higher degree of detail in specifying the stages of 
disruption to a network.  
Figure 4 shows the titular three stages of the framework proposed by (Ouyang, et al., 
2012). These being the Disaster Prevention Stage, Damage Propagation Stage, and 
Assessment and Recovery Stage.  
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1.5.2.3 Stage 1 Disaster Prevention 
The first stage, disaster prevention, represents the performance of the system from normal 
operation to the initial system disruption. This stage reflects the ability of the system to 
resist and reduce the severity of disruptions and prevent disruptive events. This first stage 
mainly focuses on local level impacts and translates hazards (disruptions) into component 
level failures (Ouyang, et al., 2012). The concept of resistant capacity is defined by the 
“Hazard Frequency” and “Initial Damage Level”. These two metrics are used in the 
determination of system performance in the first stage. This Stage represents the ability of 
a network to reduce the initial severity of an event. A road network would characterise this 
by the presence of flood immune infrastructure such as bridges and road ways above flood 
levels. 
1.5.2.4 Stage 2 Damage Propagation 
The second stage focuses on the effects of disruptions on a system wide level, effectively 
representing the specific asset failures identified in stage one as flow on consequences in 
the rest of the network (Ouyang, et al., 2012). This stage reflects the ability of the network 
to absorb shocks and continue to operate and provide a minimum level of service during 
the disruption. This would be characterised in a local road network by the presence of 
alternative routes and detours should a road be closed. Absorptive Capacity of a network is 
measured by “maximum impact level” shown in figure 4 by a Performance Level of (1 – l). 
1.5.2.5 Stage 3 Assessment and Recovery 
The third stage analyses the recovery and reconstruction portion of the response cycle, 
effectively translating external input into network restoration. In a road network this would 
be characterised by the time and cost taken to restore a road or network link to a minimum 
level of service. In this stage resilience is measured by restorative capacity which is 
represented by recovery time and recovery cost together. (Ouyang, et al., 2012) 
A summary of the metrics or “resilience correlates” used by (Ouyang, et al., 2012) in 
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measurement of system resilience is shown below in table 2.  
Table 1 - Sample Strategies to improve infrastructure system resilience per response process stage. (Ouyang, et al., 
2012) 
1.5.2.6 Calculation of AR Metric 
From the above concepts, (Ouyang, et al., 2012) defines the Annual Resilience (AR) metric 
as the mean ration of the area between the real performance curve and the time axis, and 
the area between the target performance curve and the time axis. This is expressed 
mathematically as shown in equation 2. 
𝐴𝑅 = 𝐸 [
∫ 𝑃(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
∫ 𝑇𝑃(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
] 
Equation 2 - Annual Resilience Metric Calculation (Ouyang, et al., 2012) 
(Ouyang, et al., 2012) goes on to expand on this given equation, taking into account 
multiple event occurrences at once, occurrence rates per year, hazard intensity, probability 
density, and probability mass. The addition of these metrics allows for a detailed statistical 
analysis of any systems AR value, and using this (Ouyang, et al., 2012) provides an 
extensive and thorough investigation into the resilience of the Harris County, TX power grid. 
However, to calculate these values requires extensive knowledge of statistical analysis 
which is beyond the scope of this undergraduate civil engineering research project. The 
inclusion and calculation of these additional metrics also requires detailed and established 
data records for the hazard intensity and frequency, data which is currently not available for 
the region of Wandoan, Qld. Due to these limitations these more advanced methods of 
calculating a system AR value will not be detailed in this paper.  
1.5.2.7 Framework Analysis and suitability 
This framework builds on the concepts and principals developed by (Bruneau, et al., 2003) 
to provide a more detailed and quantified analysis of a system’s resilience to disruption. 
The framework and mathematical process developed by (Ouyang, et al., 2012) allows for a 
more thorough and more easily visualised comparison of networks and proposed network 
upgrades. 
The use of this framework could successfully be used in the evaluation of the Wandoan 
West Road Network, in that any proposed upgrades could easily be evaluated for the 
potential impact on the network and contribution towards enhanced resilience. 
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However, the three-stage analysis quantifies system resilience as an AR value, or an 
Annual Resilience Value. This value is a unitless measure of resilience, and while useful 
when comparing systems on the resilience alone, this value could not successfully be used 
as supporting justification of increased expenditure on construction project, as is the intent 
of this paper.  
(Ouyang, et al., 2012) quantifies the increases in resilience of the Harris County power grid 
in the following excerpt: 
The reliability of the US power grid (with transmission line length of approximately 
300,000 km) is 99.97%, and the 0.03% unreliability level costs the economy $150 
billion per year [40]. The transmission line length in Harris County is 2 144.5 km; 
hence, according to the line length ratio from the county to national level 
(2144.5/300,000 = 0.007), a small resilience improvements may still save millions of 
dollars per year in Harris County, Texas. 
While this does provide financial justification for the upgrade of the Harris County power 
grid, the method used to calculate the financial impacts of the differing resilience levels is 
tenuous, and unlikely to provide significant support to any proposal for the upgrade of this 
grid.  
In summary, this framework effectively and succinctly evaluates the resilience of a system 
to external disruptions, and may successfully be used in the evaluation of the Wandoan 
West Road Network. However, considering the methodology and the ability of the analysis 
to be used as justification for greater government expenditure, the NIRA framework would 
prove more suitable for the evaluation of the Wandoan West Road Network.   
1.5.3 Networked Infrastructure Resilience Assessment (NIRA) Framework 
The paper Assessing Resilience in a Regional Road-based Transportation Network, was 
authored by (Omer, et al., 2013) was published in the International Journal of Industrial and 
Systems Engineering Volume 13, Number 4. This paper details the proposed NIRA 
framework for the analysis of road based transportation networks.  
The Networked Infrastructure Resiliency Assessment (NIRA) Framework was developed by 
(Omer, et al., 2013) and delivers a multi-metric approach to the assessment and analysis of 
the resiliency of networked infrastructure systems. This framework can be applied to 
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multiple systems including transportation networks, electrical grids, or water distribution 
networks. 
The NIRA framework proposed by (Omer, et al., 2013) aims to develop quantifiable metrics 
for use in benchmarking comparable networks. These metrics may also be used as an 
indication of improvements in the system’s resiliency after the implementation of resiliency 
strategies, as well as being an effective tool for comparing different options for enhancing 
the system’s resiliency (Omer, et al., 2013). 
(Omer, et al., 2013) excluded proposal and evaluation of upgrades from the scope of the 
paper, however this analysis would prove beneficial to the analysis of the Wandoan West 
Road Network. 
1.5.3.1 Definition of Resilience 
The definition of resilience in regards to infrastructure systems is defined by (Omer, et al., 
2013) as the ability of a system to bounce back after a shock and return to its normal value 
delivery levels. This definition is in accordance with that given by (Bruneau, et al., 2003) in 
the Seismic Resilience Framework, and (Ouyang, et al., 2012) in the Three-Stage 
Resilience Analysis Framework.  
Each of these definitions essentially describe the resilience of an infrastructure system as 
the ability of the system to prevent disruptions to the network, minimise the severity and 
extent of disruptions, and the ability to return to a normal level of service following 
disruptions.   
1.5.3.2 Framework Concept 
The NIRA framework proposed by (Omer, et al., 2013) is intended to quantify the resilience 
of an infrastructure network to allow the evaluation of the current level of resilience, as well 
as the potential benefits of any planned upgrades to the network in regards to enhanced 
resilience. The NIRA network consists of 6 steps split into 3 distinct stages. These are 
shown in figure 6; 
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Figure 1.24 - Networked Infrastructure Resilience Assessment (NIRA) Framework (Omer, et al., 2013) 
These steps provide a comprehensive evaluation of the current state of resilience of a 
network. These steps as developed by (Omer, et al., 2013) and the relevant actions to be 
taken should the NIRA framework be applied to the Wandoan West Road Network, are 
shown below. Further elaboration on these steps will be shown in the analysis of the 
network proposed in Chapter 3 of this paper. 
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1.5.3.3 Step 1: Define the boundary of the system 
The boundaries to be defined for the system as defined by (Omer, et al., 2013) include the 
spatial or geo-locational boundary, the temporal boundary, and the operational boundary. In 
regards to an analysis of the Wandoan West Road Network these boundaries would be as 
follows; 
 Geo-locational Boundary: The analysis of this network will extend only to roads in the 
area west of Wandoan, north of Bundi Road, and east of the Roma-Taroom Road. 
 Temporal Boundary: The timeframe for this analysis will encompass the duration of 
one flood event, with the duration of the event to be determined from historical, 
calculated, or collected data. Increases in travel time due to disruptions will be 
expressed in hours.  
 Operational Boundary: The operational boundary refers to the metric by which 
performance is measured. For the analysis of traffic flow this will be Average Annual 
Daily Traffic, defined as a common measure of traffic volume equivalent to the total 
volume of traffic passing a roadside observation point over the period of one year, 
divided by the number of days in the year (State of Queensland (Department of Main 
Roads), 2006). 
1.5.3.4 Step 2: Define the resiliency metrics of the system 
The resiliency metrics defined in this step will serve as a measure of the key performance 
indicators (KPIs) of the transport network. Similar to (Omer, et al., 2013), an analysis of the 
WWRN will use travel time and cost as measures of performance.  
These metrics have been chosen as they support the specifications of this research paper, 
in providing an analysis that is grounded and relevant to the local government operating in 
the Wandoan area. To achieve this the outputs of this analysis must be in a format to 
support any application of proposal for further construction projects, and the most effective 
support for these projects will be a cost-benefit analysis. The financial outputs to be 
provided by the use of these metrics will allow this.  
(Omer, et al., 2009) provides methods for the determination of metric values. This is 
investigated further in chapter 3. 
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1.5.3.5 Step 3: Create a network model of the system 
(Omer, et al., 2013) defines this step in the NIRA framework as the creation of a logical 
network from the physical road network, made up of nodes and links.  
The creation of this network in the WWRN would involve the creation of nodes and links 
from intersections, locations, and QCLNG access points on the road network. The addition 
of QCLNG access points to the model as nodes will allow for a more accurate modelling of 
the network during a disruption, as sections of the Phase 2 well fields will become 
accessible at different rates following flood events. By refining the network to this level the 
effect of the disruptive event on CSG development in the area can be more accurately 
modelled.  
1.5.3.6 Step 4: Resiliency Assessment of the system when exposed to various 
disruption scenarios 
This step will involve modelling disruption scenarios in the model determined in step 3, by 
the disruption of links by a reduction in performance. The resiliency metrics determined in 
step 2 will allow the effects of these disruptions to be quantified in terms of the model’s 
performance measures.  
1.5.3.7 Step 5: Identify Resiliency enhancing schemes to improve the value of 
resiliency metrics 
The results of step 4 will identify weaknesses to disruption in the system. Using the 
principles identified by (Bruneau, et al., 2003) and (Ouyang, et al., 2012), potential 
upgrades will be evaluated. 
1.5.3.8 Step 6: Perform assessment of Resiliency enhancing schemes 
Remodel the WWRN based on the upgrades identifies in Step 5, and revaluate the network. 
The differing metrics will provide potential estimates of the potential cost savings due to 
those proposed upgrades in the event of a network disruption. These potential savings may 
then be compared to the estimated cost of construction for any proposed upgrades. 
  
1.5.3.9 Framework Analysis and Suitability 
The NIRA framework proposed by (Omer, et al., 2013) is a simple, yet effective measure of 
network performance during disruptions and subsequent analysis of the network resilience. 
(Omer, et al., 2013) builds on principles explored by (Bruneau, et al., 2003) in regards to 
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resilience, and the quantification of this concept in regards to network performance. The 
concepts developed have been implemented to quantify the resilience of the network in an 
easy to comprehend, yet thorough and powerful method which would provide excellent 
justification of future construction projects to enhance the resilience of the system.  
The NIRA framework is favourable for analysis of the WWRN compared to the Seismic 
resilience framework proposed by (Bruneau, et al., 2003). This is because the NIRA 
framework successfully quantifies the resilience of the network in terms of real-world 
considerations, such as travel time, or cost incurred, as opposed to an arbitrary resilience 
coefficient.  
For this same reason the NIRA framework is preferable to the Three-Stage Resilience 
Analysis Framework proposed by (Ouyang, et al., 2012). The Three-Stage Resilience 
Analysis Frame work is a thorough and concise framework and was proved an excellent 
framework for assessment of the Harris County power grid in the case study undertaken. 
However, the methods used and data required were not suitable for evaluation of the 
Wandoan West Road Network. In addition to this, the Three-Stage Resilience Analysis 
framework produces an arbitrary coefficient for the resilience of the system, and as shown 
in the case study of the Harris County power grid, requires existing records of the cost 
implications of the event in order to translate this product into a ‘real-world’ value.  
Due to this the NIRA framework is the most suitable model for evaluation of the network 
resilience to flood events, and the financial impacts of this resilience, on the Wandoan West 
Road Network. 
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1.5.4 Characterising Resilience of Infrastructure Systems with Expert 
Judgements 
The article Towards Disaster Resilient Cities: Characterising Resilience of Infrastructure 
Systems with Expert Judgements by (Chang, et al., 2014) was published in the journal Risk 
Analysis, Volume 34, Issue 3. 
In this article (Chang, et al., 2014) proposes an approach to allow analysts to characterize a 
community’s infrastructure vulnerability and resilience in disasters. (Chang, et al., 2014) 
aims to address gaps in existing modelling which do not adequately consider cascading 
failures between dependant infrastructure systems, a sentiment substantiated by (Gordon, 
et al., 1998) in estimating that approximately one quarter of business interruption losses 
were caused by the failure of highway bridges, showing a clear dependence of the city’s 
businesses on the transportation network. This proposed approach uses non-probabilistic, 
judgement based methods to allow the characterisation of a system’s resilience to a 
specific event, and relies heavily on the input of local experts in each of the inter-reliant 
systems to be evaluated.  
To demonstrate this framework (Chang, et al., 2014) undertakes an analysis of the 
Vancouver, Canada Metro Infrastructure systems in the context of flood and earthquake 
hazards. The framework considered a variety of infrastructure systems such as: Electricity, 
Telecommunications, Water Supply, Land Transport, Healthcare, Government, Natural gas, 
and Wastewater. The use of this framework in this case study highlighted the 
interdependency of infrastructure systems on others, and the need for communication 
between the owners and operators of these networks to minimise overall disruption of the 
network.  
1.5.4.1 Concept of Resilience  
(Chang, et al., 2014) defines resilience in regards to infrastructure networks as the ability to 
“absorb shocks (from extreme events, such as natural disasters) while still maintaining 
function (in terms of providing the basis for well-being of residents)”. This definition is 
fundamentally similar to those explored by (Bruneau, et al., 2003), (Ouyang, et al., 2012), 
and (Omer, et al., 2013), though is less precise in defining the stages of a disruption and 
the properties of a resilient system. This reflects the broader and less defined scope of the 
framework proposed by (Chang, et al., 2014) compared to the other frameworks evaluated.  
 57 
 
(Chang, et al., 2014) represents the resilience of a system in a similar manner to (Bruneau, 
et al., 2003) and (Ouyang, et al., 2012) as shown in figure 8. (Chang, et al., 2014) 
references this figure as adapted from that of (Bruneau, et al., 2003).  
Figure 1.25 - Resilience Concept (Chang, et al., 2014) 
The similarity between this illustration and those developed by (Bruneau, et al., 2003) and 
(Bruneau, et al., (Ouyang, et al., 2012) 
(Chang, et al., 2014) 
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(Ouyang, et al., 2012) is demonstrated in figure 9. 
Figure 1.26 - Comparison of Resilience Concept Illustrations (Bruneau, et al., 2003) (Chang, et al., 2014) (Ouyang, et al., 
2012) 
As shown in the above comparison, all of these frameworks, including the NIRA Framework 
by (Omer, et al., 2013) though not illustrated, conceptualise the resilience of a system 
during a disruptive event as the loss of system performance during and after the event. 
When expressed graphically as above this can be described as the area between the actual 
performance curve and regular performance benchmark.  
A facet of system resilience explored by (Chang, et al., 2014) which was not discussed in 
the earlier frameworks, is the idea that multiple infrastructure networks are dependent on 
each other to provide a regular level of performance, and so disruptions to one network 
may have flow on effects to the others. (Bruneau, et al., 2003) touched on the issue in 
consideration of multiple infrastructure systems contributing to the resilience of a 
community as a whole, but (Chang, et al., 2014) expands on this by stating that the reduced 
performance of one network will affect the reduced performance of another. This is the key 
differentiating factor in the framework proposed by (Chang, et al., 2014).  
1.5.4.2 Framework Concept 
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The framework proposed by (Chang, et al., 2014) follows a methodological approach in the 
analysis of a system resilience to disruptions and shocks. This process relies heavily on 
interviews and input of experts and operators of each of the interdependent networks to be 
assessed. This is likely made necessary due to the broad scope of the framework where 
quantifiable measures as proposed in the NIRA Framework by (Omer, et al., 2013) and the 
Three-Stage Resilience Assessment Framework by (Ouyang, et al., 2012), would result in a 
substantial and cost-prohibitive data collection and analysis exercise. The process and 
framework overview is shown in figure 10. 
Figure 1.27 - Methodological Approach (Chang, et al., 2014) 
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The structuring and conditioning stage is similar to the boundary definition step employed in 
the NIRA framework, where boundary conditions for the systems to be assessed are 
defined and the existing data collected. Following this, using an interview sheet developed 
by (Chang, et al., 2014), Industry experts from each system are interviewed in order to gain 
a subjective and judgement based assessment of the likely effects the defined event would 
have on their respective system. The disruptions to these systems are quantified as low, 
moderate, or severe disruptions, with the classification used to determine the severity 
shown in figure 11. The duration of the disruption is displayed over the timeframes of 0 
hours (the time of event), 72 hours, or 2+ weeks.  
Figure 1.28 - Classification of service disruption levels (Chang, et al., 2014) 
Following collection of this data from expert interviews, (Chang, et al., 2014) collates this 
data into service disruption diagrams and interdependency diagrams. The service 
disruption diagram provides a graphical overview of the forecast disruption to each network. 
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The service disruption diagram completed by (Chang, et al., 2014) in the Vancouver Metro 
case study is shown in figure 12. The Interdependency diagram also stems from the data 
collected in the expert interviews, and shows the level of disruption in each system, as well 
as the interdependences of the systems and the severity of the dependencies. The 
interdependency diagram completed by (Chang, et al., 2014) in the Vancouver Metro case 
study is shown in Figure 13.  
Figure 1.29 - Estimated Service Disruption Levels M7.3 Earthquake Scenario (Chang, et al., 2014) 
Figure 1.30 - Infrastructure interdependencies and service disruptions (Chang, et al., 2014) 
The final step in the framework proposed by (Chang, et al., 2014) involves a workshop 
involving previously interviewed experts, and a summary report which presents the findings 
of the analysis, including any additional findings raised at the final workshop. The intention 
of the final workshop is to gather experts from all the interdependent systems, and present 
the identified links and dependencies to the group. This then allows the experts of this 
group to gain a better awareness of the external infrastructure systems which impact on 
their system, and the systems which their system in turn impacts.  
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1.5.4.3 Framework Analysis and Suitability 
The framework proposed by (Chang, et al., 2014) provides a valuable contribution to the 
analysis of infrastructure systems through the simple, practical, and easily executed 
manner of analysis. Of the frameworks analysed this provides the most practical method for 
enhancing intersystem resilience in a community. The ability to undertake this analysis 
without advanced computations or data manipulation means that this analysis and the 
accompanying workshops could likely be undertaken by most local governments, who 
would otherwise have difficulty sourcing the specialist staff or data required to completed an 
analysis such as the Three-Stage analysis.  Furthermore, the involvement of the system 
operators in both the workshops and data collection process by (Chang, et al., 2014) will 
provide these staff with a better understanding of the need for the network analysis, and 
ensure that the system operators have a vested interest in the outcomes of the study.  
While this framework is well suited to a practical analysis of complex communities with 
many interdependent infrastructure systems, it is not intended for the analysis of a single 
system’s resilience as intended for this research project. However, the concept of the 
interdependencies diagram provides an interesting and useful concept for the graphical 
representation of network dependencies and associated weaknesses.  
The scope of this paper is the evaluation of the Wandoan West Road Network and the 
network resilience to flooding. While the impact on the road network will likely impact the 
performance of other infrastructure systems in the area, this is not to be evaluated and as 
such this framework is not suitable for use in the analysis to be undertaken.  
  
 63 
 
1.5.5 Selection of Framework for use in the Analysis of the Wandoan West 
Road Network 
Following investigation and evaluation of the existing literature and developed frameworks, 
the Networked Infrastructure Resiliency Assessment (NIRA) framework proposed by 
(Omer, et al., 2013) has been identified as the framework most suitable for use in the 
analysis of the Wandoan West Road Network (WWRN). This is because the outputs of this 
framework most align with the objectives of this paper, and the desired outcomes of 
analysis of the WWRN. Furthermore, this framework has previously been successfully 
applied to the analysis of the Boston-New York regional road network, and the data 
required to perform this analysis aligns most closely with that available for the WWRN.    
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2 METHODOLOGY 
2.1 OVERVIEW 
The methodology section of this paper will detail the processes and constraints to be used 
in the achievement of the project objectives as detailed earlier. The adopted methodology 
will include: 
 Road Network characteristics for consideration. 
The characteristics that define road network are extensive and diverse. In order to 
ensure that a reliable dataset is collected and analysed, we must limit the road asset 
data to be considered and ensure that this is relevant to the planned analysis.  
 Economic Consideration Boundaries 
The purpose of analysing the resilience of this particular road network, is to quantify 
the cost of any reduction in the level of service of the road, and thereby quantify the 
cost savings of any road upgrades. In addition to traffic generated by CSG 
development, there will also be traffic produced by other industries and local 
residents. In order to ensure a reliable dataset and minimise the raw data collection 
required, certain aspects of the expected traffic and associated cost may not be 
analysed depending on the quality and quantity of data available. 
 
 Data Collection and Analysis 
Following collection of economic and road network data, the data must be reviewed 
in order to ensure it is whole, relevant and reliable. Any shortcomings in the data 
identified by this review must then be accounted for in any subsequent analysis in 
order to ensure an unbiased and rounded result is determined.  
 
 Consideration of proposed upgrades 
When determining potentially beneficial upgrades as a result of the analysis, it is 
important to remember the remoteness of the area in which these upgrades will be 
hypothetically constructed, and the lack of access to certain materials, plant and 
techniques which may be able to be implemented elsewhere. Any suggested 
upgrades should be relevant to the constraints posed on site, and able to be 
constructed using local resources.  
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 Project Plan 
This section will details the resources, anticipated risks, and necessary requirements 
to achieve the stated project goals.  
2.2 ROAD NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS 
There are many diverse attributes which may be used to classify a road. For the purpose of 
this analysis the attributes assessed will be limited to those which will affect the ability of a 
road to function as designed during and in the period following a flood event.  
2.2.1 Network Location 
The location of the road network will be limited to the Wandoan Region of the Western 
Downs Regional Council. The student currently works closely with WDRC in employment to 
Brandon and Associates, an engineering consulting firm. As such WDRC asset data is 
available to the student, and permission for the use of this data has been granted by 
Graham Cook, the Director of Engineering Services for WDRC. 
2.2.2 Flood Impact Data 
The data to be used in modelling disruptions to the network will be based on historic flood 
data from one of two major flood events in the years 2011, and 2013. This data has been 
previously collected by WDRC in their restoration of this work as funded by the Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority, though is of varying quality. 
This data documents the damage to the network and specific locations, as well as the 
actual cost to repair this damage. This data will provide insight into the reduced level of 
service as a result of the flood event, as well as anticipated repair costs, and the time taken 
to return the road to the previous level of service following the flood event.  
Analysis of the available data for these two events will be compared, and the most suitable 
selected for use in modelling of network disruptions. 
2.2.3 Road Surface  
The characteristic of a sealed surface, as well as the seal width is a key indicator of the 
roads intended wet weather serviceability. A bituminous wearing surface not only provides 
longevity to the granular pavement material by preventing wear, but also provides an 
impervious layer which prevents moisture ingress into the pavement materials. This 
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ensures the pavement material remains fully compacted and tightly bound, preventing 
deformation under traffic loads. 
Lack of a sealed surface will result in a road that is likely to have surface deformations 
following wet weather requiring maintenance to correct. An unsealed road surface will also 
require traffic to travel slower due to reduced traction in wet weather, as well as reduced 
driver confidence in the road conditions.  
Furthermore an unsealed road surface which is formation only, that is where there is no 
imported granular material used as road pavement, likely to have the intended level of 
service drastically reduced following a flood event due to the factors outlined above, 
coupled with the poor material properties of a typical insitu material, such as the commonly 
found loam. These types of roads are susceptible to extensive surface deformation under 
traffic loads when the material has been subject to moisture ingress, and are considered 
trafficable during moderate and greater rain events.  
2.2.4 Pavement Material 
The specific pavement material type will not be considered in this assessment of existing 
road assets, as this is difficult to determine without extensive materials testing of the road 
pavement itself. However, the use of stronger materials which are less susceptible to failure 
when saturated, will be considered as a viable option to increase the resilience of a 
particular road asset when evaluating upgrade options.  
2.2.5 Network Extents  
For the purpose of this analysis the extents of the road network to be analysed will be 
limited to those roads shown in figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1 - Wandoan West Road Network Extents 
The network will be limited to these extents as this road network encompasses all roads 
likely to be significantly affected by the proposed resource developments, the effects on 
which are to be analysed.  
2.3 ECONOMIC ATTRIBUTES 
Resource development is not expected to be the only industry producing traffic which is 
likely to use the network to be assessed, and as such not the only industry expected to 
suffer additional development and operational costs as a result of disruptions to the 
network. These are detailed further below. 
2.3.1 Coal Seam Gas Industries 
These companies are suspected to be the major industry to be effected by disruptions to 
the road network, as this industry has the highest running costs, and most significant capital 
investment of all industries in the area. Taking into account the scale of development 
currently underway in the area as well, the CSG industry is expected to be that most 
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significantly effected as a result of decreased production and stand down rates of the 
construction and operations staff.  
The costs as a result of lost production will be evaluated as the increased operation cost 
expected as a result of increased travel time or stand down time for staff travelling to and 
from site as a result of these disruptions. These may be estimated using traffic volumes if 
the resource companies are unable to provide this data. The effect of lost profit due to 
delays in development are also expected to be significant, however these will be more 
difficult to estimate unless provided by the resource companies.  
2.3.2 Other Local Industry  
Being a rural area the majority of other local industry is expected to be primary industries, 
with land not currently in use by the resource industry being used by graziers and for 
cropping purposes. These industries would rely on the network most heavily when 
harvesting or transporting stock to sale. Typical of this industry, these business are usually 
family run partnerships or sole proprietors, and as such records or traffic impacts and 
losses due to decreased production are not likely to be kept or made available to external 
parties. In addition to this the majority of the staff required to operate these businesses are 
expected to live on the property itself, meaning the surrounding road network is not often 
required as a means of transporting staff to site.  
Due to these considerations these industries will not be considered when assessing the 
economic impacts of disruptions to the local road network.  
2.3.3 Local Residents 
Local residents are also expected to incur additional cost if required to take an alternative 
route in the event of disruptions to the network. However, without extensive survey of these 
landowners this cost would be impossible to determine. As such this will not be included in 
analysis of the economic impacts of network disruptions 
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2.4 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
2.4.1 Collection of Required Data 
As detailed above, all asset and network data will be extracted from the WDRC Asset 
Register with permission granted by WDRC Management to the use of this material. As the 
student is currently seconded to WDRC full time in the role of Consultant Technical Officer, 
they have the ability to access these systems and extract this data directly.  
Data regarding expected resource company activity on the network will also be provided by 
WDRC, as provided to them by QGC as part of the development application associated 
with these resource works.  
Further Economic data to be provided by QGC would prove valuable in the evaluation of 
costs associated with disruptions to the network. This data will be requested by the student 
directly to a QGC representative. The contact details of this representative have been 
provided by WDRC staff liaising with QGC. 
2.4.2 Analysis of Data using established Framework 
Following collection of this data as detailed above, an established framework for the 
analysis for network disruptions will be applied. These frameworks have been investigated 
in the literature review process, and can be readily applied to the asset data and economic 
data to be collected.  
This will require the determination of a network as a series of nodes and links, which can 
readily be applied to the physical network. This would see intersections be converted to 
nodes, and linking road segments be converted to links. Further to this, as QGC access to 
well sites as detailed in Appendix 1 occur along the road lengths between intersections, the 
major accesses will also be expressed as nodes to allow fine analysis of the economic 
impacts of an event depending on the restriction of access to the various well sites.  
Following determination of the nodal network, disruptions caused by flood events can be 
modelled by disrupting links in the network corresponding to areas historically prone to 
damage during the past flood events. These areas can be determined using the historic 
WDRC flood data collected as detailed earlier, including the time taken to return each link to 
the design level of service following the flood event. These disruptions can then be 
assessed using the chosen framework in order to quantify the cost to road users as a result 
of the disruptions caused by these historic flood events.  
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Following this analysis of the existing network, the network will be remodelled with a 
number of currently proposed upgrades included.  
The network will then be analysed again with these proposed upgrades in order to provide 
a quantitative increase in resilience for each suggested project. This increase in resilience 
will then be compared against the estimated cost of each project, and from this a series of 
recommendations provided as to possible infrastructure upgrades to be undertaken in the 
future, in order to increase the resilience of the WDRC Local Roads Network under 
flooding. 
 
2.4.3 Expected Outcomes 
Successful determination and analysis of this network would yield the following deliverables 
to assist in the determination of key projects necessary for increase in flood resilience of the 
WDRC local roads network: 
 Determination of the most suitable framework for use in the assessment of a regional 
local government road network. To be suitable for analysis of these networks the 
framework would be required to consider changes in level of service, repair costs to 
expected damage, and financial loss incurred by both private and government 
organisations due to network disruptions. 
 Evaluation of the network using the determined framework, and the modelling of 
actual network disruptions through the use of historic flood data to give an insight 
into the current level of flood resilience in the network. 
 Determination of the most critical points in a network which were subject to failure 
during these events, the proposal or evaluation of upgrades, and the remodelling of 
the network with these upgrades in order to determine a quantifiable increase in 
network resilience as a result of these upgrades.  
 Recommendation of a number of network improvements considering the estimated 
increases in network resilience modelled, and the estimated cost of these upgrades.  
2.5 PROPOSED UPGRADE CONSTRAINTS  
When considering the proposed upgrades it is important to ensure any suggested 
treatments are feasible for construction at the site specified. This must take into account the 
materials required for production, and the expertise and equipment required. 
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2.5.1 Availability of Materials 
The Western Wandoan region has little in the way of natural gravel deposits suitable for 
sealed road construction. As such the range of materials is limited to WDRC produced 
crushed laterite, which typically performs poorly when saturated, or more expensive 
commercial quarry material.  
Concrete is available sourced from a Boral Plant in Wandoan, however supply costs are 
much higher than experienced in other areas.  
Bitumen Chip Seals are the preferred sealing treatment as the nearest asphalt plant is 
located in Toowoomba, approximately 5hr travel from the region. 
Restrictions such as these will need to be considered when assessing the feasibility of the 
proposed upgrade treatments.  
2.5.2 Construction Process 
Local WDRC crews are likely to perform any upgrade work undertaken and, though the 
upgrades suggested in this report are unlikely to be actually constructed, the specialist 
experience and access to equipment of the staff who would be undertaking the construction 
should be considered when suggesting possible upgrades. 
These local works crews have extensive experience working the local laterite and ridge 
gravel material, and are capable of finishing these works to a high standard suitable for 
bitumen sealing. However local WDRC crews have little experience with, and no access to 
the plant required to perform treatments such as insitu lime or concrete stabilisation. 
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2.6 PROJECT PLANNING 
In order to ensure the successful completion of the process described above, identification 
of resources required, and risks associated, is required. 
2.6.1 Resource Requirements 
The resource requirements of the project are detailed in the table below. 
Item Amount Source Cost 
WDRC Flood Damage Data N/A WDRC NIL 
WDRC Asset Register N/A WDRC NIL 
Additional Site Specific Data N/A Student NIL 
Transportation to Site N/A Student NIL 
Word Processor N/A Student NIL 
Microsoft Excel N/A Student NIL 
Graphics Calculator N/A Student NIL 
Table 2 - Project Resource Requirements 
Western Downs Regional Council has given permission for the student to access all historic 
flood damage data, including financial records, for the purpose of this research project. As 
the legal owner of this information and confidential data, WDRC will retain ownership of this 
data and therefore must give permission before this information may be used in any form of 
external analysis or distributed to any third party. 
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2.6.2 Risk Assessment 
The risk assessments below aim to identify hazards to both the person and project during 
activities that are expected to occur throughout the course of the project. The Risk matrix 
being used was developed by (University of Southern Queensland, 2008) and is shown 
below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 - Risk Assessment Matrix (University of Southern Queensland, 2008) 
From this the following Personal Risk Assessment and Project Risk Assessment have been 
developed. 
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2.6.2.1 Personal Risk Assessment 
The below risk assessment details anticipated risks to the student while performing 
activities expected to be undertaken during the project duration. From these mitigation 
methods have been determined.  
Task Hazard Risk Minimisation 
Extended use of 
computer 
Repetitive strain injury or 
development of bad 
posture. 
M 
Ensure correct posture and 
ergonomics are used when 
spending prolonged periods of 
time working on computer. Take 
regular breaks. 5-10 mins every 
1.5 hours. 
Collection of 
additional Data 
Onsite 
Exposure to excessive 
heat or Sun. 
H 
Time site visits for early morning 
when UV index is low and 
temperature is mild. Apply 
appropriate sun protection and 
consume large amounts of water. 
Collection of 
additional Data 
Onsite 
Driver fatigue when 
travelling to remote sites H 
Break from driving every 1.5 
hours and do not undertake a trip 
if feeling fatigued. 
Collection of 
additional Data 
Onsite 
Isolation when visiting 
remote sites alone 
H 
Setup a Journey management 
system where someone is aware 
of the destination, the route being 
taken, and the expected time of 
arrival and return. 
Collection of 
additional Data 
Onsite 
Trip Hazard when 
navigating uneven 
ground on site 
H 
Do not run. Walk slowly and 
maintain 3 points of contact on 
steep slopes. 
Collection of 
additional Data 
Onsite 
Drowning when visiting 
bridge sites M 
Do not come within 1.5m of any 
body of water of depth greater 
than 0.3m, or unknown depth. 
Collection of 
additional Data 
Impact with Vehicle when 
collecting data in a 
M 
Wear appropriate Hi Vis PPE. 
Maintain alertness to traffic. Only 
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Onsite roadway. cross or work within roadway 
when necessary and for the 
minimum time required.  
Table 3 - Personal Risk Assessment 
2.6.2.2 Project Risk Assessment 
An assessment of the anticipated risks to the successful completion of this project has been 
undertaken, with the results and minimisation strategies shown in table 3.2.  
Task Hazard Risk Minimisation 
All 
 
Loss of Data 
M 
Backup all data and working to 
hard storage and available 
cloud storage. 
All 
 
Poor Time 
Management 
H 
Develop study habits which 
regularly see small sections of 
work addressed. Set 
additional reporting dates with 
supervisor and work 
colleagues to ensure project 
development stays on track.  
All 
 
Physical health 
M 
Maintain Healthy Diet and 
Exercise Routine. 
Access to 
WDRC data 
Work commitments 
see student removed 
from position with 
WDRC and lose 
access to necessary 
data. 
M 
Continue monitoring of current 
workload to ensure that if a 
shift is to occur, all necessary 
data has been collected by 
that time.  
Table 4 - Project Risk Assessment 
2.6.3 Ethical Considerations 
Should the resource companies approach grant access to the specific economic data 
requested, this data is likely to be highly sensitive as it may be used by other companies 
when negotiating contracts or fees with the relevant company. In order prevent any 
negative repercussions to the company as a result of the provision of this data, the Student 
will suggest that a representative of the company review the finished project prior to 
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submission in order to ensure the data provided has not been misused. The Student will 
also agree to use this data for the purpose of this research project only, and not distribute 
said data without the express written permission of the company.  
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2.6.4 Communication Plan 
This Project Communication Plan outlines the communication links necessary for the 
successful delivery of the project. These links are outlined in both figure 4.2.1 and the 
sections below. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 - Project Communication Plan 
 
2.6.4.1 USQ Supervisor 
Communication between supervisor and student will take place primarily via phone and 
email as the student is currently working full time and does not have access to USQ on 
weekdays. Physical visits will be valuable however and the student will aim to achieve a 
face to face meeting with the supervisor a minimum of once per two months as both parties 
schedules allow. In addition to this there will be regular monthly updates on student 
progress to seek input on project development as well as to develop accountability as a 
form of time management. 
 
2.6.4.2 Western Downs Regional Council 
The student will maintain constant contact with WDRC, not only to ensure access to the 
necessary data, but also to seek input from WDRC as to the development of the project and 
the outcomes that would prove most valuable to a regional council. In addition to this the 
WDRC representative is an experienced engineer with many years of practical asset 
management experience. This practical input will be invaluable in ensuring the outcomes of 
the project remain useable in the workplace. 
 
Sam Fitzgerald 
(Project Student) 
Trevor Drysdale 
(Project Supervisor) 
Michael Coutts 
(WDRC Area 
Manager) 
WDRC USQ 
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2.6.4.3 Resource Companies 
In order to gain access to specific economic data to be used in the determination of the 
costs anticipated during network disruptions, the Student will be required to make contact 
with the relevant resource companies to request this data. It will also be necessary to have 
a representative of this company review the finished document in order to approve the 
context in which the data is used prior to submission.  
2.6.5 Special Requirements 
At current there are no special requirements. WDRC may enforce confidentiality on any 
data provided, and will retain ownership of any data used. As such this data will not be 
released to any third party without express written approval of WDRC. The resource 
companies approach may enforce similar conditions on any economic data provided.  
2.6.6 Project Schedule 
This project will consist of the following phases. These timeline of these events is detailed 
in the Figure 2.4 
1. Preliminary Phase 
1.1. Development of project specification. This document will detail project aims and 
objectives. 
1.2. Research Proposal. This current document will combine the literature review and 
project specification along with a course of action for completing the project. 
1.3. Literature review. This will expand on the preliminary literature review included with 
this document and will aim to investigate past and current research into the topic, 
and provide a sound foundation of knowledge for the development of the project 
ideas.  
2. Start-up phase 
2.1. Confirmation of resources. This will include applying for permission to use or access 
to any data required to complete analysis of the local roads network. This will also 
include a preliminary review of the existing frameworks in order to determine the 
extent and types of data required to complete the network assessment. 
3. Evaluation Phase 
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3.1. Framework Evaluation. This will include evaluation of all existing frameworks and 
the determination of the most suitable framework for use in this particular analysis. 
3.2. Data Evaluation. Following the determination of a specific framework, the collected 
data will be reviewed in order to determine a final scope, dependant on the data 
required for the chosen framework, and the quality of the data collected from each 
region.  
4. Network Assessment Phase. 
4.1. Development of network models. This will include the translation of the selected 
WDRC Network into a model or series of models which will allow analysis of the 
physical network. 
4.2. Calculation of Network Resilience. This will include the modelling of past network 
disruptions as indicated by the 2011 and 2013 flood data collected. This data will be 
modelled using the chosen framework and the impact of the disruption on the entire 
network analysed. 
5. Asset Upgrade Phase. 
5.1. Preliminary investigation of upgrade options. This will include assessment of 
proposed QGC upgrades to the Wandoan West rural Road Network associated with 
phase 2 development of CSG sites in the area.  
6. Reassessment Phase. 
6.1. Recalculation of network resilience. This will include modelling of the network with 
the proposed upgrades in order to assign an increase in network resilience as a 
result of these upgrades. This will include comparing the potential increases in 
resilience with the estimated cost of each upgrade.  
7. Write-up Phase 
7.1. Prepare Preliminary Report. 
7.2. Prepare Progress Assessment. 
7.3. Draft Dissertation. This will involve collation of all findings into a draft dissertation for 
supervisor review. 
 80 
 
7.4. Final dissertation. This will include the amending of the draft dissertation as per 
supervisor and other feedback.  
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Figure 2.4 - Project Schedule 
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2.6.7 Quality Assurance  
As there is no physical testing involved in this research project, there will be no 
necessary quality controls needed to be put in place in regards to data capture. This 
being said, captured data will be review in order to confirm reliability, and identify any 
missing data to be accounted for. There is expected to be a small degree of 
modelling and calculation involved. This work will be quality assured by review by 
associates of the student experienced in both computational and desktop modelling, 
and advanced mathematics. 
The remainder of the project will be reviewed for quality by means of Peer Review. 
One such peer will be the project supervisor who will review results and drafts 
periodically at the milestone events indicated in the above project schedule.  
Additional peer review will also be undertaken by experienced engineering staff 
known to the student, including colleagues and mentors as well as graduate 
engineers and experienced asset management engineers. This will provide a wide 
and varied range of professionals experienced in all aspects of the project to provide 
thorough and relevant review of project quality. 
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3  NETWORK ANALYSIS 
3.1 ANALYSIS OF EXISTING ROAD NETWORK USING NIRA FRAMEWORK 
The following section will detail an analysis of the existing network resilience to a 
Q100 flood event using the NIRA Framework identified, and using historic defect 
data from a previous Q100 event, the 2011 Flood Event, to estimate and simulate 
reduced network capacity during and after the event.  
3.1.1 Define Network Boundaries 
The physical road network to be analysed for the assessment of resilience of the 
Wandoan West Road Network is shown below. This network constitutes all 
connected roads between Wandoan, the assumed source point, and the QGC 
access points as stipulated in Appendix 1 – Phase 2 Tranche 1B off-plot road 
upgrades. These access points are assumed to be destinations for the purpose of 
network analysis.  
Figure 3.1 - Physical Transportation Network - Wandoan to QGC Phase 2 Plot Accesses (Google Earth, 2015) 
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In development of the network model, only those roads likely to be used as 
alternative routes to the destinations shown will be included. This will exclude access 
only roads, as well as roads in the more northern and southern areas of the network, 
as these roads are unlikely to ever be used as by QGC or QGC Contractor traffic 
when accessing the development sites shown.  
 
Figure 3.2 - Logical Network of WWRN (Wandoan to QGC Phase 2 Sites) 
Two main potential links have been omitted from the network diagram shown in 
Figure 3.2. Justification for these is as follows: 
 Grosmont Road (W-13). This road was excluded as an unsealed road, with a 
low level bridge. Due to this the bridge will become untrafficable before the 
bridge on Bundi Rd (1-2) and Booral Rd (11-10), and so does not propose an 
alternative route of any value during an event. Being an unsealed road as 
well, it is likely to sustain greater damage than Bundi Rd and Booral Rd 
following an event.  
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 Yeovil Road (11-14). This road has been excluded as the main creek crossing 
on this road is at a low level, similar to Booral Rd (11-10). This road, along 
with Boral Rd, is sealed for a 6 meter width. As such this road offers no 
advantage as an alternative route to Booral Rd (11-10-14) apart from a longer 
route.  
With the spatial boundary now defined, the temporal and operational boundaries 
remain. The temporal boundary, or timeframe for which the analysis will be 
conducted, will be the full scope of a Q100 flood event network disruption. This 
timeframe will be assumed to coincide with the construction phase of the QGC 
Phase 2 developments as detailed in Figure 1.9.  
The operational boundary refers to the major product of the system being analysed. 
As the WWRN is a road transportation network, this boundary would be defined in 
traffic flow. This value will be analysed in vehicles per hour. As the forecast traffic 
data provided is in the form of vehicles per day, this will be converted assuming an 
even distribution of the traffic volumes given, over a standard 12 hour work day.  
3.1.2 Define System Metrics for Analysis  
System metrics to be used in analysis of the WWRN resilience to flooding, are to be 
the major performance indicators of the network, which by measurement of these 
metrics provides an indication of the quality of service provided by the Transport 
Network (Omer, et al., 2013). As defined by (Bruneau, et al., 2003), resilience can be 
expressed as a value of 0 to 1, with 1 being optimum performance not affected by 
disruption, and 0 being a complete lack of performance.  
As this paper aims to evaluate the effect of network disruptions during a Q100 Flood 
Event on CSG development in the area, the metrics chosen must reflect the 
indicators of highest priority to the companies undertaking these developments.  
The primary need and concern of these companies in regards to the performance of 
the road network, is the supply of materials, plant, and labour to QGC on which 
these developments are occurring. These concerns can be expressed as the travel 
time on the network, and the cost of this travel in terms of plant and labour hire 
costs. Also of concern would be any penalties or lost profits associated with delays 
to the construction programs of these developments. Unfortunately this information 
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has not been provided at the time of writing this report, and so these additional 
considerations will be omitted from any evaluation.  
There currently exist a number of proposed methods for calculation of travel time 
reduction due to congestion and reduced capacity, such as the ARRB Travel Cost 
Method (ATCM), The Austroads National Performance Indicator (NPI) Program, and 
the ARRB Congestion Model (ACM) (Austroads, 2009). All of these methods are 
developed specifically to assess congestion of major motorways or urban arterial 
roads, and as such make use of detailed data collected which details traffic 
composition, flow, speed, and road capacity.  
Roads in the WWRN experience negligible traffic volumes compared to the roads 
intended for evaluation by these methods, and as such the data required and 
methodology used is inappropriate for use in assessing the WWRN. However, the 
principles suggested by the above mentioned methods are relevant, and are similar 
to the principle of resilience as investigated by (Omer, et al., 2013) and (Bruneau, et 
al., 2003), in expressing decreases in network performance as a ratio of actual or 
estimated performance against benchmark or optimum performance. These 
principles have been the foundation of the below proposed metrics for calculating 
travel time and travel cost resilience on a rural road network.  
 
𝑅_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ = ∑ 𝑅_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘
𝑛
1         (1) 
𝑅_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘 =  
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐵𝐸
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐴𝐸
         (2) 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝐸 = 𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐸[(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑉 × 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝐿𝑉) + (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐻𝑉 × 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝐻𝑉)]  (3) 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝐸 = 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐸[(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑉 × 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝐿𝑉) + (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐻𝑉 × 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝐻𝑉)]  (4) 
𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐸 = 𝑡_𝑂𝑝𝑡(𝑉𝐵𝐸)          (5) 
𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐸 = 𝑡_𝐸𝑠𝑡(𝑉𝐴𝐸)          (6) 
𝑡_𝑂𝑝𝑡 =
𝑙
𝑆_𝑂𝑝𝑡
           (7) 
𝑡_𝐸𝑠𝑡 =  
𝑙
𝑆_𝑂𝑝𝑡×𝐿𝑅𝐹
          (8) 
𝐿𝑅𝐹 = 1 −  ∑ 𝑅𝐹𝐻𝑛𝐻1           (9) 
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𝑅𝐹 =
𝑆_𝐻𝑎𝑧
𝑆_𝑂𝑝𝑡
×
𝑙_𝐻𝑎𝑧
𝑙
                  (10) 
𝑅_𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘 =
𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐸
𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐸
                  (11) 
𝑅_𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ =
∑ 𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐸
∑ 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐸
                 (12) 
Where; 
𝑅_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ  is the cost resilience of the path, made up of a series of links 
𝑅_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘   is the cost resilience per individual link 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝐸  is the Calculated cost of travel per link, Before Event 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝐸  is the calculated cost of travel per link, After Event 
𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐸 is the cumulative travel time per link for conditions and traffic 
volumes before the disruptive event 
𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐸 is the cumulative travel time per link for conditions and traffic 
volumes after the disruptive event 
𝑡_𝑂𝑝𝑡   is the optimum travel time per link with no disruptions 
𝑡_𝐸𝑠𝑡 is the estimated travel time per link considering cumulative 
reductions in speed due to hazards on the link 
𝐿𝑅𝐹 is the Link Reduction Factor, which represents the cumulative 
effect of multiple reductions in speed due to multiple hazards 
over an entire link. 
𝑅𝐹 is the hazard reduction factor, calculated as a proportion of 
reduced travel time due to decreased speed caused by an 
individual hazard against optimal travel time, represented as a 
proportion of the link length effected. 
𝑆_𝑂𝑝𝑡   is the optimum travel speed on the link with no disruptions 
𝑆_𝐻𝑎𝑧   is km/h decrease in speed required to negotiate a hazard safely 
𝑙_𝐻𝑎𝑧   is the length for which the hazard effects travel speed 
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𝑙   is link length in kilometers 
𝑉𝐴𝐸 is the traffic volume of the link following a disruptive event, 
accounting for additional traffic diverted from failed links 
𝑉𝐵𝐸   is the traffic volume of the link before the disruptive event 
𝑅_𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘  is the travel time resilience for a link 
𝑅_𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ  is the travel time resilience for a path, or series of links 
Equations (7) – (10) allow individual hazards caused by network disruptions to be 
analysed and their cumulative effect represented as a decrease in link performance 
for the optimal benchmark. The cumulative increase in travel time can then be 
illustrated by equations (5) and (6), before translating these additional hours travel to 
the estimated additional financial impact of these delays by equations (3) and (4). 
Once this analysis has been completed on a per link basis, these findings can then 
be applied to determined paths to demonstrate the overall cost in terms of labour 
and plant, and lost time, by the use of equations (1), (2), (11), and (12).  
These series of equations have been formatted to the following excel sheet, to allow 
input of individual hazards on individual links, determination of the effects of these 
hazards on the performance of the link, and the analysis of multiple links as paths.  
Note the value for reduced speed is a subjective value determined by review of 
damage photos as included in WDRC Submitted and Approved NDRRA Form 4 
Grant Applications. The assumed cost per hour for operators, and light and heavy 
vehicles is derived from typical costs experienced in the road construction industry 
for Engineers, Foremen, Plant Operators, and Labourers. The assumed cost per 
vehicle was likewise determined.  
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Figure 3.3 - Example Individual Link Performance Analysis Sheet (Link 11-10 Booral Rd) 
Link ID:
Value Unit
0.93
634.04$         $/Day
8,008.18$     $/Day
8,642.22$     $/Day
48.5
Hours 
(cumulative)
52.4
Hours 
(cumulative)
Symbol Value Unit
l 10.45 kilometers
S_Opt
90 km/hr
t_Opt
0.12 hours
V_BE
418
vehicles per 
day
S_Opt
90 km/hr
LRF
0.93
t_Est
0.13 hours
V_AE
418
vehicles per 
day
Hazard ID Ch. St. Ch. Fn. Dist
Reduced 
Speed
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor
W1-001 2.6 2.9 0.3 60 0.019
W1-002 3 3.5 0.5 60 0.032
W1-003 3.9 4.2 0.3 60 0.019
W1-004 4.6 4.65 0.05 60 0.003
1.5 1
35.0$             180.00$         
70.0$             60.00$           
140.0$           240.00$         
0.750 0.25
11-10
Occupants per HV
Cost/hour per HV
Cost/hr per occupant
Total cost/hr per HV
Proportion HV
Occupants per LV
Cost/hour per LV
Cost/hr per occupant
Total cost/hr per LV
Proportion LV
tt BE
tt AE
Assumed and Given Values
Travel Cost Before Event
Travel Cost After Event
Symbol
R_Time Link
R_Cost Link
Cost BE
Cost AE
Traffic Volume after event (taking into account increased 
traffic due to reduced performance of other links
Individual Hazard Input
Individual Link Performance Analysis Sheet
Pre/Post Disruption Performance Analysis
Link Overview
Description
Travel Time Before Event
Travel Time After Event
Link Travel Time Resilience
Link Travel Cost Resilience
Mean Speed under normal operating conditions
Optimum Travel Time
Traffic Volume under normal operating conditions
Mean Speed under normal operating conditions
Link Reduction Factor
Estimated Travel Time
Description
Pavement Failure
Pavement Failure
Pavement Failure
Pavement Failure
B
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Link Length
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3.1.3 Development of Network Model 
From the physical network a logical network model of nodes and links is developed, 
and Paths to the four QGC Development Destinations determined. Paths will be 
modelled on actual design paths as provided in Appendix 1 Phase 2 Tranche 1B Off-
Plot Road Upgrades. This same document provides traffic volumes for the period to 
be analysed. The below figure shows the determined network. 
 
Figure 3.4 - WWRN Logical Network Showing Sources, Destinations, Nodes, and Links 
To allow analysis of these links the traffic volume per link (V_BE) and Link Reduction 
Factor (LRF), must first be determined from collected QGC Histograms as shown in 
Appendix 1, and WDRC Flood Damage Defect Information as shown in Appendix 5. 
Note that actual damage photos have not been included due to the significant size 
and quantity of these records. Examples of these photos can be viewed in Section 
1.4.2 of this paper. These damage photographs were used to make a subjective 
analysis of the individual hazard’s impact on the optimal operating speed.  
 91 
 
Determination of V_BE per link is undertaken by a comparison of QGC Phase 2 
forecast traffic histograms as provided to WDRC, and the corresponding link to the 
physical network segments represented in these histograms. For example, link (8-9) 
represents the physical network segment of Cecils Road between the intersection of 
Ryals Road and Kubunga/Booral Road. The V_BE value for this segment is directly 
determined from the below histogram excerpt. For the purposes of this analysis, the 
V_BE value will be taken as the maximum monthly ADT for the first construction 
phase.  
Figure 3.5 - Excerpt Appendix B (Cecils Rd bet Kubunga Rd and Ryals Rd) forecast traffic histogram 
Analysis of the provided histograms yields the following V_BE values per link under 
QGC designated access paths. Note that traffic is not constant for the duration of the 
path, and this is assumed to be due to QGC traffic accessing various well sites along 
each link and thereby not travelling Node-Node. For the purposes of this analysis it 
will be assumed that the traffic volumes given for each link travel from Node-Node on 
the network. This is necessary as without further data provided by QGC, it is 
impossible to estimate the length on each link the resource traffic travels.  
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Link 
Determined 
V_BE 
Comments 
W-1 419 
Page 4, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Bundi Rd (Bet Cecils Rd & L Rd) 
W-11 0 Not Optimal Design Path 
1-2 419 
Page 4, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Bundi Rd (Bet Cecils Rd & L Rd) 
2-3 419 
Page 4, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Bundi Rd (Bet Cecils Rd & L Rd) 
2-12 0 Not Optimal Design Path 
3-4 419 
Page 4, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Bundi Rd (Bet Cecils Rd & L Rd) 
3-12 0 Not Optimal Design Path 
4-C 285 
Page 9, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Bundi Rd (Bet Point C & Cecils Rd) 
4-8 339 
Page 6, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Cecils Rd (Bet Ryals Rd & Bundi Rd) 
5-C 158 
Page 2, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Bundi Rd (Point C to Ch 30.98) 
5-6 53 
Page 14, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Perretts Rd (Bet Bundi Rd & Ryals Rd) 
6-7 73 
Page 13, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Perretts Rd (Bet Goldens Rd & Ryals Rd) 
6-8 339 
Page 15, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Ryals Rd (Bet Perretts Rd & Cecils Rd) 
7-B 73 
Page 8, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Goldens Rd (Bet Point B & Perretts Rd) 
7-D 73 
Page 12, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Perretts Rd (Bet Point D & Goldens Rd) 
8-9 98 
Page 10, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Cecils Rd (Bet Kubunga Rd & Ryals Rd) 
9-A 98 
Page 11, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Kabunga Rd (Bet Point A & Cecils Rd) 
9-10 44 
Page 16, Average Daily Traffic volume (2-Way) 
Booral Rd (Ch: 15.7 to 19.2) 
10-11 0 Not Optimal Design Path 
10-13 0 Not Optimal Design Path 
10-14 0 Not Optimal Design Path 
12-13 0 Not Optimal Design Path 
14-A 0 Not Optimal Design Path 
Table 5 - Determined V_BE values for network links 
With the calculation of the above V_BE values, the individual link performance 
analysis sheet can now be completed for each link in the above path using 2011 
Flood Damage Restoration Data collected.  
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3.1.4 Assessment of Network Resilience  
The above metrics were applied to each link in the WWRN as identified in the paths 
discussed earlier. A number of links were not analysed due to the expectation that 
no QGC or Contractor traffic is expected to travel these roads a part of the forecast 
developments. The updated network with redundant links removed is shown below.  
Figure 3.6 - Updated WWRN with links redundant to CSG Development Traffic Removed 
The metrics for measurement of link performance were applied to each link in the 
above network using the Individual Link Performance Analysis Sheet. The link values 
for input, were collected from the relevant sources for each link. The value input for 
link length was measured using Google Earth and the network overlay constructed 
earlier, and the value used for mean speed in normal operating conditions was set 
as a standard 70km/h for unsealed roads, and 90km/h for a sealed road. 
The individual hazard information was collected from 2011 Flood Event Form 4 
Grant Applications submitted to the QRA by WDRC for funding of restoration of the 
2011 Flood Damage works. An extract of the hazard information given by these 
forms is shown below. An estimation of necessary speed reduction per hazard was 
made by the student, using damage submission photos and personal driving 
experience on these roads as references.  
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Figure 3.7 - Form 4 Grant Application (Cecils Rd) 2011 Flood Damage Restoration 
Sheet Number:
Please tick
Western Downs Regional Council 
Cecils Road
X017
Section 1
Asset Description / Service Level
Cause of Damage
Start Finish Dist (km)
Photo 
Reference
Description of Asset Damage
Proposed/Completed Restoration & specification of 
Engineering Standards / Building Codes (where changing)
Unit Qty Rate Amount
1.3 1.35 0.05 Cecils RD Wandoan 1.3Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 56 68.55 $3,838.80
1.55 1.6 0.05 Cecils RD Wandoan 1.55Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 32 68.55 $2,193.60
 1.61 1.65 0.04 Cecils RD Wandoan 1.61Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 32 68.55 $2,193.60
1.7 1.75 0.05 Cecils RD Wandoan 1.7Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 40 68.55 $2,742.00
1.8 1.85 0.05 Cecils RD Wandoan 1.8Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 32 68.55 $2,193.60
2.1 2.15 0.05 Cecils RD Wandoan 2.1Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 32 68.55 $2,193.60
2.2 2.3 0.1 Cecils RD Wandoan 2.3Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 90 68.55 $6,169.50
2.4 2.45 0.05 Cecils RD Wandoan 2.4Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 40 68.55 $2,742.00
2.55 2.59 0.04 Cecils RD Wandoan 2.55Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 56 68.55 $3,838.80
2.6 2.64 0.04 Cecils RD Wandoan 2.6Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 56 68.55 $3,838.80
2.65 2.8 0.15 Cecils RD Wandoan 2.8Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 135 68.55 $9,254.25
3.35 3.4 0.05 Cecils RD Wandoan 3.35Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 32 68.55 $2,193.60
3.5 3.55 0.05 Cecils RD Wandoan 3.55Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 56 68.55 $3,838.80
3.65 3.7 0.05 Cecils RD Wandoan 3.65Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 32 68.55 $2,193.60
4.1 4.15 0.05 Cecils RD Wandoan 4.1Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 56 68.55 $3,838.80
5.15 5.2 0.05 Cecils RD Wandoan 5.15Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 32 68.55 $2,193.60
5.8 5.85 0.05 Cecils RD Wandoan 5.8Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 32 68.55 $2,193.60
6.05 6.1 0.05 Cecils RD Wandoan 6.05Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 56 68.55 $3,838.80
6.2 6.25 0.05 Cecils RD Wandoan 6.2Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 40 68.55 $2,742.00
6.98 7 0.02 Cecils RD Wandoan 6.98Gravel scouring and rutting Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 32 68.55 $2,193.60
7.1 7.2 0.1 Cecils RD Wandoan 7.2 Place 150mm of gravel, mix, re-compact and shape m3 90 68.55 $6,169.50
Total: $72,594.45
.
Estimator: Signature: Date:  ______/______/______
Signature: Date:  ______/______/______
SHEET 1 of 1
4.
Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements
Restoration of Essential Public Assets - Grant Application
multi sites, one road submission
Department of Infrastructure and Planning
Local Government and Planning Group
FORM 4
       Estimates
Single lane gravel road 4m wide.
Monsoonal rains, creek and overland flooding caused high flow rates across floodways, inundation of pavements and saturation of subgrade. This has resulted in loss of pavement materials, 
rutting and scouring of table drain.
NDRRA Event: Queensland Flooding and Tropical Cyclones Tasha and Anthony November 2010 - February 2011
Local Government Area (LGA)    o    Emergent work
Asset / Road Name        Restoration work
Chainage / Coordinates
20
We certify that the proposed / completed restoration works are required as a result of an activated natural disaster event and complies with the Queensland Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements 
2009/10.  We certify that the photographs supplied are a true and accurate record of the damage sustained to the asset at the specified location indicated above.  We certify that no ordinary wages / salaries 
have been included in this submission nor any other costs that are ineligible under the NDRRA arrangements.  We certify that funding approved will only be used for the specified restoration for this site. 
Accountable 
Officer:
Graham Cook - Director of Engineering 
Services
Road Number    o    Actuals
Site Number
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The Individual Link Performance Analysis Sheet than calculates travel time and cost 
prior to and following the disruptions to the network as represented by the hazard 
data entered. An example of a completed analysis sheet using hazard data given by 
Figure 3.7 is shown below. A summary of the results of these individual sheets per 
link is shown in Appendix 6.  
Link ID:
Value Unit
0.74
1,886.10$     $/Day
5,433.69$     $/Day
7,319.79$     $/Day
32.9
Hours 
(cumulative)
44.4
Hours 
(cumulative)
Symbol Value Unit
l 6.8 kilometers
S_Opt 70 km/hr
t_Opt 0.10 hours
V_BE
339
vehicles per 
day
S_Opt 70 km/hr
LRF 0.74
t_Est 0.13 hours
V_AE
339
vehicles per 
day
Ch. St. Ch. Fn. Dist
Effectiv
e Dist
Speed 
Reduction
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor
1.3 1.35 0.05 0.25 30 0.013
1.55 1.6 0.05 0.25 30 0.013
1.61 1.65 0.04 0.24 30 0.013
1.7 1.75 0.05 0.25 30 0.013
1.8 1.85 0.05 0.25 30 0.013
2.1 2.15 0.05 0.25 30 0.013
2.2 2.3 0.1 0.3 30 0.016
2.4 2.45 0.05 0.25 30 0.013
2.55 2.59 0.04 0.24 30 0.013
2.6 2.64 0.04 0.24 30 0.013
2.65 2.8 0.15 0.35 30 0.019
3.35 3.4 0.05 0.25 30 0.013
3.5 3.55 0.05 0.25 30 0.013
3.65 3.7 0.05 0.25 30 0.013
4.1 4.15 0.05 0.25 30 0.013
5.15 5.2 0.05 0.25 30 0.013
5.8 5.85 0.05 0.25 30 0.013
6.05 6.1 0.05 0.25 30 0.013
6.2 6.25 0.05 0.25 30 0.013
1.5 1
35.0$             180.00$         
70.0$             60.00$           
140.0$           240.00$         
0.750 0.25
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Total cost/hr per LV Total cost/hr per HV
Proportion LV Proportion HV
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Assumed and Given Values
Occupants per LV Occupants per HV
Cost/hour per LV Cost/hour per HV
Cost/hr per occupant Cost/hr per occupant
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
Gravel Scouring and Rutting
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Link Reduction Factor
Estimated Travel Time
Traffic Volume after event (taking into account increased 
traffic due to reduced performance of other links
Individual Hazard Input
Description
tt AE Travel Time After Event
Pre/Post Disruption Performance Analysis
Description
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 Link Length
Mean Speed under normal operating conditions
Optimum Travel Time
Traffic Volume under normal operating conditions
Mean Speed under normal operating conditions
Cost BE Travel Cost Before Event
Cost AE Travel Cost After Event
tt BE Travel Time Before Event
Link Overview
Symbol Description
R_Time Link Link Travel Time Resilience
R_Cost Link Link Travel Cost Resilience
Individual Link Performance Analysis Sheet
4-8
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Figure 3.8 - Example Individual Link Performance Analysis Sheet (Cecils Rd) Link (4-8) 
This analysis then provides a value for the Travel Time Resilience of the link, as well 
as the Additional Travel time cost due to disruptions per link. These results are 
shown in the table below. 
Link R_TimeLink R_CostLink Surface Type 
W-1 1  $                   -    Sealed 
1-2 0.84  $          734.01  Sealed 
2-3 0.97  $          140.23  Sealed 
3-4 0.98  $            81.23  Sealed 
4-C 0.98  $            68.01  Sealed 
5-C 0.95  $            94.80  Sealed 
8-9 0.8  $            64.27  Sealed 
9-10 1  $                   -    Sealed 
4-8 0.74  $      1,886.10  Pavement Only 
6-7 0.78  $          109.93  Pavement Only 
7-D 0.79  $          139.36  Pavement Only 
9-A  1  $                   -    Pavement Only 
5-6 0.89  $          165.81  Formation Only 
7-B 0.89  $          137.06  Formation Only 
6-8 0.91  $          787.09  50% Seal/50% Pavement Only 
Table 6 - Results of Individual Link Resilience Analysis 
These results are also illustrated in the below graphs showing travel time resilience 
and travel cost resilience per link.  
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Figure 3.9 - Travel Time Resilience Per Link (WWRN) 
Figure 3.9 clearly shows the links most significantly effected in terms of travel time 
resilience are the pavement only links (4-8), (6-7), and (7-D). This is to be expected 
as scouring and rutting of pavement are common occurrences during periods of 
heavy overland flow. The above chart also illustrates the lack of resilience in link (1-
2). This link is a sealed road in a low lying, flat area immediately adjacent to 
Wooleebee Creek. As such this area is known to be susceptible to flooding, with 
water ponding by the roadside following these events. The factors have resulted in 
the area of physical network represented by (1-2) being known as a problem area, 
as reflected in the above chart.   
Surprisingly the gravel pavement roads would appear to have a lesser degree of 
resilience to flood events than the formation only roads. Given that the resilience of 
the road is directly proportional to the length of road effected by the registered 
hazards, it is suspected that rather than these pavement only road sustaining less 
damage than the formation only roads, it is likely that defects requiring a corrective 
grade only following these event were not registered in the submission to the QRA. 
This is because the cost of maintenance grading a gravel or formation only road is 
substantially less than the cost of importing additional pavement material. Due to 
this, it is likely that any minor maintenance grading on these roads was included in 
WDRC routine maintenance to the portions of the network, rather than being 
included in the submissions for restoration.  
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Figure 3.10 - Travel Cost Resilience of the WWRN individual Links 
Figure 3.10 expresses the resilience of the WWRN links in as an expected additional 
travel cost per day for forecast CSG Development traffic travelling on the links. The 
development of the above chart takes into account not only the travel time resilience 
per link, but also the volume of traffic expected to utilise each link. This provides 
weighting to more frequently used links of potentially higher resilience than those of 
lesser used links of low resilience.  
This is necessary for the consideration of the impacts of a flood in terms of financial 
cost to CSG development, as this identifies the key network links of the greatest 
vulnerability, and potential for cost to the company. This is shown in Figure 3.10 by 
the proportionally high cost per day of links (1-2), (4-8), and (8-6).  
Link (1-2) is the link discussed earlier which frequently experiences troubles due to 
flooding or heavy rainfall. This coupled with the fact that all CSG development traffic 
in the WWRN must use this road to access the area, provides a vulnerable link 
prone to disruption, with a high traffic volume, and large capacity for additional cost 
as a result of hazards on the link.  
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Link (4-8) Cecils Rd is an unsealed road which has a forecast traffic volume of 339 
vehicles per day during the construction phase of the planned CSG developments in 
the area. Being an unsealed road the pavement is susceptible to damage during 
heavy rainfall and flood events, as demonstrated by the historic defect data extracted 
from WDRC records in Figure 3.7. This susceptibility to damage coupled with the 
high traffic volume, provides the most vulnerable link in the network, in terms of 
potential cost due to increased travel time.  
 
Figure 3.11 - Forecast Traffic Volume Per Link 
Link (6-8) records the second highest cost due to increased travel time of the 
network. The cause of this is similar to that discussed above in regards to link (4-8), 
with the exception that approximately 5.17km of the total 10.4km link length is 
sealed. The impact this has on the frequency of hazards, the direct measure of link 
resilience, is shown by the Form 4 extract below.  
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Figure 3.12 - Ryals Rd - 2011 Flood Damage Restoration Form 4 
Note that 5 of the 7 recorded defects are located in the unsealed section of road 
from Ch: 0 to Ch: 5.23. It would appear that the 5.17km of bitumen seal on Ryals Rd 
has contributed substantially to the increased resilience of this road, which would 
likely be comparable to the resilience of link (4-8) due to similar traffic volume and 
geography.  
Using equations (1) and (2) it is then possible to analyse the total resilience and total 
cost to CSG development during the restoration period of the flood event. This yields 
the following results. 
R_Timetotal = 0.90 
 
The total resilience is obtained by finding the ratio of total travel time per day on the 
network in cumulative hours, before and after the event. In this scenario the total 
travel time before disruption was 284.52 hours per day, and the time following 
disruption was estimated at 314.30 hours per day. 
R_Costtotal = $4,913.16/day  
 
The total cost due to additional travel time is the sum of all costs per link.  
Considering that the resilience calculated is a representation of the network 
performance during the network restoration phase of recovery, the resilience can be 
plotted against time taking into account the historic firsthand accounts on WDRC 
staff to calculate the period of total network failure during which all major bridges 
were unusable. This plot also takes into account the timeframes by which the 
recovery works were delivered. For the purpose of this analysis it will be assumed 
that following a lag of 6 months during which submissions were made to the QRA 
and approvals received, restoration of network performance occurred in a linear 
manner over a period of an additional 6 months. Given delivery of the 2011 Event 
Start Finish Dist (km) Photo Reference Description of Asset Damage
0.3 0.4 0.1 Ryals Road 0.3 - 0.4 Pavement inundation resulting in gravel scouring and rutting
0.5 0.6 0.1 Ryals Road 0.5 - 0.6 Scouring of floodway
0.8 0.9 0.1 Ryals Road 0.8 - 0.9 Pavement inundation resulting in gravel scouring and rutting
2.3 2.4 0.1 Ryals Road 2.3 - 2.4 Pavement inundation resulting in gravel scouring and rutting
2.9 3.1 0.2 Ryals Road 2.9 - 3.1 Pavement inundation resulting in gravel scouring and rutting
9.2 9.25 0.05 Ryals Road 9.2 Scouring of floodway
10 10.05 0.05 Ryals Road 10 Deposits of silt & debris on floodway
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was not completed for a duration of 2.5 years following the event, this assumption is 
considered conservative.  
 
Figure 3.13 - Total System Travel Time Resilience 
The above assumptions used in the creation of figure 3.13 are overly simplified for 
the sake of illustrating the similarity between the chart in figure 3.13, and (Bruneau, 
et al., 2003) conceptual illustration of resilience, shown below. Though the above 
chart is a distorted version due to the long timeline of network recovery, the same 
profile demonstrating an initial shock to the network and decrease in network 
performance, and gradual recovery to optimal operating conditions is shown.  
Figure 3.14 - Conceptual Definition of Network Resilience (Bruneau, et al., 2003) 
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Using the same assumed timeframes the cost due to increased travel time over the 
network can be illustrated. Identical timeframes for network total failure, restoration 
to minimum level of service, assessment of damage, and linear recovery to full 
service have been used in calculation of the below chart.  
 
Figure 3.15 - Cumulative Cost Due to Additional Travel Time 
This chart follows a similar trend in a sharp increase in cost due to total network 
failure and the associated stand down and accommodation costs of the entire 
development workforce, as calculated from the histogram data provided earlier. This 
is followed by a significant levelling out of cost as the network becomes operational 
and the additional cost is only that associated with increased travel time. The cost 
due to increased travel time will continue to accrue in a linear fashion for the 6 
months required to undertake collection and submission of defects, and receive 
approval for works from the QRA. This increase will continue to accrue over the 
following 6 months but at a diminishing rate as the network is restored to full 
operational capacity.  
3.2 PROPOSED NETWORK UPGRADES 
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As Part of Phase 2 Off Plot Upgrades, QGC plan to fund sealed and unseal road 
upgrades to a number of roads which provide access to phase 2 developments. 
These upgrades are shown as a general summary in the extract of Appendix 1 
below. 
Figure 3.16 - QGC Phase 2 Planned Off-Plot Road Upgrades 
These upgrades are intended to provide as safer road environment for the high 
volumes of construction traffic forecast to be produced by phase 2 construction, as 
well as to offset the reduction in useful life of these road assets due to traffic volumes 
much greater than those designed for.  
While these upgrades are not being undertaken with the sole intention of increasing 
network resilience to flooding, increases in resilience will be achieved due to the 
higher quality of asset produced.  
These proposed upgrades will be modelled in the NIRA framework in the same 
manner as the existing network, with increases in performance being reflected in the 
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elimination of relevant hazards used in the original analysis, in the upgrade sections. 
For example, if a gravel road previously recorded scour to pavement caused by 
heavy rainfall and the proposed upgrade for this section is construction of a bitumen 
seal, these defects would be eliminated from the Individual Link Performance 
Analysis Sheet as they are unlikely to occur following the upgrade. This will produce 
a higher level of resilience for these assets which will then be compared with the 
resilience metrics of the original analysis.  
A summary of the proposed upgrades is given below: 
 BUNDI RD, Links (1-2), (2-3), (3-4), (4-C), and (5-C): Proposed upgrades 
include reconstruction and overlay of existing road including reinstatement of 
bitumen seal to 8+m width. Overlay will increase the level of the road and 
reduce the chance of overtopping in moderate rainfall and flood events. 
(SMEC, 2014) 
 CECILS Rd, Links (4-8): Proposed upgrades include upgrade or replacement 
of existing drainage structures, construction of pavement to 8m width 
including 8m width bitumen sealed surface (SMEC, 2014). 
 GOLDENS Rd, Link (7-B): Includes upgrade of drainage works and gravel 
surfacing overlay (SMEC, 2014). 
 PERRETTS RD, Link (6-7): Includes upgrade of drainage works and gravel 
surfacing overlay (SMEC, 2014). 
 RYALS RD, Link (6-8): Includes reconstruction of bitumen pavement, 
upgrade of drainage works, and gravel overlay to unsealed section. (SMEC, 
2014). 
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3.3 ANALYSIS OF NETWORK FOLLOWING IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSED 
UPGRADES USING NIRA FRAMEWORK 
The upgrades proposed as discussed in chapter 3.2 will increase resilience of the 
network by lessening the severity or nullifying some of the hazards expected as a 
result of a Q100 Flood Event. To analyse the impacts these upgrades will have on 
the network, the Individual Link Performance Analysis will be completed for the same 
scenario, omitting or lessening the effect of hazards where relevant to the upgrade 
sections. The results of this analysis will then be compared to the original analysis to 
determine the enhanced resilience of the WWRN with these constructed upgrades.  
Changes or omissions to historic 2011 Flood Event hazards per link are shown in 
Appendix 5. A summary of the calculations of this second iteration analysis is shown 
in Appendix 7. 
This analysis yielded the following results, shown below in comparison to the original 
resilience values obtained per link. 
 
Upgrade Analysis Existing Analysis 
Link R_TimeLink R_CostLink R_TimeLink R_CostLink 
W-1 1.00  $               -    1.00  $               -    
1-2 0.92  $     324.93  0.84  $      734.01  
2-3 0.99  $        51.72  0.97  $      140.23  
3-4 0.99  $        43.14  0.98  $        87.23  
4-C 1.00  $        11.65  0.99  $        47.01  
5-C 0.99  $        22.81  0.95  $        94.80  
4-8 0.90  $     619.29  0.69  $  2,406.37  
8-9 0.80  $        64.27  0.80  $        64.27  
6-7 0.84  $        72.75  0.78  $      109.93  
5-6 0.89  $     165.81  0.89  $      165.81  
7-D 0.79  $     139.36  0.79  $      139.36  
7-B 0.93  $        87.68  0.89  $      137.06  
6-8 0.96  $     382.03  0.91  $      787.08  
9-A 1.00  $               -    1.00  $               -    
9-10 1.00  $               -    1.00  $               -    
Table 7 - Reanalysis Resiliency results for WWRN 
This data is shown comparatively in the charts below. These charts best illustrate the 
increases in Link resiliency due to these upgrades, and the overall network resiliency 
increase as a result of these strengthened links.  
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Figure 3.17 - Comparison of Travel Time Resilience Before and After implementation of Proposed Upgrades 
The above chart effectively illustrates the increases to resiliency due to the proposed 
upgrades. The most significant upgrade being link (4-8) with an increase from 0.69 to 
0.90 due to the bitumen sealing of the road on this link. As all the hazards on this link 
were related to wear of loss of gravel pavement materials, this sealing effectively 
removed the possibility of these hazards occurring, though an allowance was made 
for scouring of the road shoulder in these same areas.  
Link (1-2) show a marked increase from 0.84 to 0.92. This increase is attributed to 
the overlay and building up of the road above the surrounding flood plain. This is 
expected to result in less pavement and seal damage due to moisture ingress in a 
flood event.  
Other increases in resilience are observed in links (6-7), (7-B), and (6-8) due to 
planned gravel and drainage upgrades on these roads. These upgrades are less 
significant than that observed in (4-8) due to the road remaining an unsealed 
pavement road, meaning the road will still be susceptible to the same hazards 
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encountered in the initial analysis, though the severity of these hazards has been 
assumed to be reduced due to the increased useful life of the new gravel pavement, 
improvements to drainage, and improvements to road geometry.  
 
Figure 3.18 Comparison of Additional Travel Costs per Link 
The same trends identified in the initial analysis of cost resilience are observed in 
figure 3.18, with link (1-2), (4-8), and (6-8) still proving the most vulnerable to 
disruption and increased travel cost, though these values are significantly reduced 
from those generated in the original analysis. The cause of these decreases in 
vulnerability and potential loss are the same as those discussed in the above section 
in regards to increased travel time resilience, improved road geometry and drainage, 
the sealing of previously unsealed links, and the renewal of gravel pavement 
material. It is expected that these reductions may be further enhanced if a less 
conservative analysis of the reductions to hazards as a result of the upgrades was 
undertaken.  
Equations (1) and (2) may be used again in determination of the network wide 
resiliency values for travel time and cost and thereby calculate the potential financial 
implications of this increase in network resilience.  
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R_Timetotal = 0.93 
 
In this updated scenario the total travel time before disruption was 284.52 hours per 
day, and the time following disruption was estimated at 296.56 hours per day. This is 
a total travel time resilience increase of 0.03 or 3.3%. 
R_Costtotal = $1,985.43/day  
 
The total network cost due to disruption has decreased from a previous value of 
$4,913.16/day to $1,985.43/day, a decrease in cost and proportional increase in 
resilience of 59.59%. 
Comparison of the above metrics illustrates the comparatively minor increase to 
overall resilience. Though this time resilience increase is minor, the upgrades are still 
able to provide significant increase to cost resilience when links with large traffic 
volumes and high susceptibility to damage, both of which contribute to the potential 
cost due to disruption of a link, are targeted. 
Total resilience of the network over the entire duration of the Flood Event will now be 
charted to allow comparison of the proposed enhanced network to the existing 
network analysis performed earlier. All assumed timeframes and impacts will remain 
constant and unchanged. 
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Figure 3.19 - Overall System Resilience Comparison Plot 
As observed in the earlier plot, the initial decrease in performance remains constant 
as the main bridges providing access to the network will remain disrupted in an 
event. No upgrades at all were proposed for these structures and as such their 
performance under identical conditions remains unchanged. Likewise emergent 
works restoration to the level of resilience calculated is assumed to progress 
identically in a linear fashion. This is likely to actually be completed in a shorter 
timeframe due to a decrease in emergent works damage that would be expected 
following the proposed upgrades, however any analysis of this response time would 
be pure conjecture without data for the original emergent works period, which is not 
available.  
The increase in overall resilience is best demonstrated in the recovery period, as the 
network is returned to a higher level of service following the emergent works period, 
due to the greater resiliency of the strengthened network links.  
The impact of these strengthened links on expected Travel Cost increases is shown 
below. 
Figure 3.20 - Cumulative Travel Time Cost Comparison Plot 
The initial disruption period of this chart is identical to that of the original analysis, 
due to labour costs per day and the period of total network disruption remaining 
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constant. This is followed by a significant levelling out of cost as the network 
becomes operational and the additional cost is only that associated with increased 
travel time, which is 60% lower than that of the original network model analysed. 
This cost remains constant for a 6 month period in which defects are collected and 
submitted to the QRA, and then continues to accrue but at a reduced rate as the 
network is returned to service. 
The effect of these upgrades in terms of financial cost savings during a disruption 
event is clearly shown by the comparison of the two trendlines shown in Figure 3.20. 
Over the full duration of the event, these upgrades are calculated to provide a cost 
savings in terms of reduced losses, of $809,519.86.  
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4 DISCUSSION 
4.1 COMPARISON OF NETWORK BEFORE AND AFTER UPGRADES 
The potential cost savings due to increases in link and network resilience are 
substantial with estimated savings of up to $810,000 over the one year duration of 
the simulated event recovery. A potential saving of 40% belies the minor 3.3% 
increase in total network resilience shown by figure 3.19. This disproportionate 
increase in the differing metrics is due to the weighting of the metric criteria. The total 
network travel time resilience weights each individual road equally when determining 
the overall resilience of the network, where travel time cost resilience is magnified by 
the volume of traffic per link.  
When used in conjunction the two metrics provide a useful assessment of 
hypothetical network performance by providing a snapshot of overall network travel 
time resilience, while also highlighting the highest priority links for upgrade by 
identifying the potential losses due to disruptions as shown by figure 3.20. 
 
Figure 3.18 Comparison of Additional Travel Costs per Link 
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The above figure highlights the maximum efficiency of upgrades when applied to the 
most vulnerable and most frequently used links. Though this statement is likely 
already a well-established fact and principle of network management, the analysis 
undertaken provides a means of clearly identifying and quantifying the importance 
and vulnerability of each link, while also clearly demonstrating the relationship 
between the two.  
As shown in figure 3.20, the most dramatic and effective increases in resilience 
occur when upgrading the road surfacing to a higher asset class. Link (4-8) was the 
only link which is currently planned for a surfacing class upgrade, from that of a 
pavement only road to a bitumen surfaced road. The significant increases in 
resilience to this road can be attributed to the removal or reduced likely hood of 
hazards on the road due to this sealed surface upgrade. All historic 2011 Flood 
Event damage to Cecil’s Road was scouring or rutting of the gravel surface. Over the 
full 6.8km length of the link there was a total of 19 defects. The cumulative effect of 
these defects was a substantial decrease in travel time due to the speed reductions 
required to navigate these defects. By sealing the road, this eliminates or 
substantially reduces the chance and impact of scouring or rutting on the link. This 
results in savings in travel time, the value of which is amplified by the high traffic 
volume forecast to use the link.  
In contrast the diminished returns of link (6-8) compared to link (4-8) can be 
attributed to the road upgrade restoring the existing asset class rather than 
upgrading this to a higher class, as given by the gravel upgrades to the existing 
gravel road. Indeed, the major increase in this link resilience is due to the elimination 
of the hazards associated with the existing floodway which is proposed to be 
upgraded to a large RCBC structure, again attributed to an increase in asset class 
rather than a restoration of the existing class.  
An exception to this is the noted resilience increase in link (1-2). This asset remains 
a sealed road in the proposed upgrades, however shows a reduction in potential 
losses of $409, or 55.7%. This can be attributed to the specific upgrades of this link 
in regards to the specific hazards anticipated. The historic hazards experienced 
consisted of damage to drainage structures, and damage of the road shoulder due to 
moisture ingress. The risk of both of these hazards has been offset by the proposed 
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upgrades in raising of road height above flood levels, and the construction and 
replacement of existing drainage structures. This demonstrates that upgrade of an 
entire link is not necessary to increase the resilience of the link, but may be achieved 
by addressing persistent and specific hazards in the link with relevant solutions, such 
as construction of a culvert where scouring of an invert occurs, or bitumen surfacing 
in areas where scouring of road pavement is of particular concern.  
Overall, while the proposed upgrades to the road network are not proposed with the 
intention of increasing the network flood resilience only, the proposed upgrades have 
the potential to offer significant cost savings to the network users in the event of a 
flood event of the simulated magnitude.  
4.2 SAVINGS IN RESILIENCE AGAINST ESTIMATED PROJECT COST 
Estimated project costs for the entirety of the proposed upgrades, though existing 
estimates are available for links (1-2) and (4-8), which are two of the three most 
significant links in terms of potential savings in travel cost.  
Figure 4.1 - Potential Savings Per Link due to Increased Link Resilience 
Modelled in an identical manner to the total network cost shown in figure 3.20 and 
3.15, the above chart illustrates well potential savings of the two links over the total 
event duration. Note that the event period of total network disruption has not been 
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included as the cost incurred in this period remains constant despite the proposed 
upgrades.  
Link (1-2) offers a potential cost saving of $107,571 over the entire event duration of 
1 year. The current cost estimate for construction of the proposed upgrades to this 
link is $1,950,000. At a cost 18.1 times the expected cost savings, this upgrade does 
not present value for money if constructed for the sole purpose of improving the link 
resilience to flood events. Likewise, link (4-8) provides an estimated cost saving of 
$510,335 over the total duration of the simulated event. When compared to an 
estimated construction cost of the proposed upgrades of $2,500,000, the cost to 
construct is 4.9 times the expected cost savings again, this does not present 
sufficient justification for the upgrade of these links.  
Other considerations have been the major driving factors in proposing these 
upgrades. These include, reduced pavement useful life due to significant traffic 
volume increases, improved road safety for CSG Development generated traffic, and 
increased capacity to these roads to better cater to the traffic volumes forecast. 
Considering this, increased resilience and the expected cost savings which 
accompany the increase in resilience, still show clear financial reasoning for the 
proposed upgrades and, when used in addition to other supporting factors, may 
prove effective in justifying a proposal for upgrades to the road network.  
4.3 PROPOSED FURTHER NETWORK ENHANCEMENTS 
As demonstrated by figure 3.20, the major contributing factor to increased cost due 
to disruption in the simulated event, is the total network failure as caused by 
inundation of the low level bridges at all creek crossings in the area. The cumulative 
loss in the first 3 days following the event beginning, an estimated cost of $711,400, 
was incurred due to labour costs of the entire construction workforce over this 3 day 
period.  
The most vital bridges in regards to the CSG Development traffic would be the two 
bridges located in link (W-1) and the single bridge located in link (1-2). While the 
upgrade of these bridges would prove beneficial to the network, this is unlikely to 
increase network performance in an event of this magnitude as many other 
floodway’s and low level crossings in the rest of the network are likely to also be 
 115 
 
 $-
 $500,000.00
 $1,000,000.00
 $1,500,000.00
 $2,000,000.00
 $2,500,000.00
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 T
ra
ve
l T
im
e
 C
o
st
 
Duration from event (days) 
CUMULATIVE TRAVEL TIME COST  
unusable. Also the anticipated cost of reconstructing three bridges would be cost 
prohibitive, especially considering the statistical probability and frequency of the 
simulated event. 
Figure 4.2 - Cumulative Travel Time Cost Comparison Plot 
The most practical enhancement to network resilience identified by this analysis, 
would be an increase in response and restoration times. The cumulative cost of 
defects to the network during the assessment and submission, and restoration 
portions of the recovery is shown in figure 3.20. These values are calculated on a 
cost per day basis considering the effect of hazards on each link, therefore if the 
duration the link traffic is exposed to the hazard is reduced, the cost associated will 
reduce proportionally.  
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Figure 4.3 - Event Duration Cost Comparison 
The above figure illustrates the potential cost savings due to swifter restoration 
network links to full operational capacity. This chart compares the 1 year duration 
assumed in earlier analyses, with a 2.5 year duration which better reflects the actual 
delivery time of the 2011 Flood Damage Restoration Program.  
4.4 POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS AND FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
4.4.1 Framework Suitability  
Considering the low volume and rural environment of the Wandoan West Road 
Network, the majority of the frameworks evaluated were not suitable as these relied 
on expansive and detailed data for the road network to be analysed. The NIRA 
network provides a simple and logical method of analysing the resilience of a 
network to disruptions, though the methods for quantifying the metrics used (Omer, 
et al., 2013) heavily relied on in-depth network data. Due to this a proportional 
method for quantifying the metrics of travel time and cost due to increased travel 
time was developed. This method proved simple enough to utilise the limited data 
available, but robust enough to provide relevant and useful analysis of the network.  
A limiting factor in the use of this method is that it provides an assessment of a 
moment in time, meaning that it is not dynamic in modelling the changes in resilience 
over time. Should this be required to be analysed, multiple iterations of the analysis 
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must be undertaken at key points in the recovery timeline, and the results 
extrapolated between these points. While this proved simple enough for a simple low 
volume network such as the Wandoan West Road Network, if a larger, more 
complex network were being considered this method would prove time consuming 
and ineffective.  
Similarly to the above, the network analysis undertaken considers only a single 
event. In the example of this paper, the cost savings calculated apply only to a Q100 
magnitude event, though there would be increases in resilience and associated cost 
savings in more minor events as a result of these same upgrades to the network. To 
fully consider these additional cost savings would require flood modelling of the 
catchments and waterways in the network area, and similarly further iterations of the 
analysis would be required for each of these lesser magnitude events.  
The framework used also does not consider the probability of the events being 
analysed occurring. This would be a key component in any analysis undertaken to 
provide justification for upgrade of the network, as the likelihood of the cost savings 
calculated would be required in order to provide a thorough cost benefit analysis of 
the proposed upgrades.  
While the above limitations do not subtract from the validity of the analysis 
undertaken in this paper, they do highlight potential areas for improvement in the 
framework which would provide a more comprehensive and useful analysis should 
this be used in the industry.  
 
4.4.2 Network Model 
The model developed for the Wandoan West Rural Road Network was a logical 
system of nodes and links reflecting the physical network, and proved a satisfactory 
medium for the evaluation of the network performance metrics.  
The metric analysis could be improved by a more standardised method of assessing 
the impact of hazards on travel speed. This is the major defining factor in 
determination of the link and network resilience, and as such the development and 
application of a standardised method for assessing these hazards would provide 
more consistent and reliable assessment of the network.  
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These findings could also be better presented in the cumulative travel time plots and 
overall system resilience plots by increasing resilience proportionally as individual 
roads are restored to full function. This could be achieved by application of actual 
delivery timeframes from the 2011 Flood Event Recovery by WDRC, and would 
provide a more realistic representation of the network resilience over time, though 
this would require a more detailed collection of the data, as discussed in the sections 
below. This required data collection was not available for the analysis undertaken for 
the Wandoan West Rural Road Network. 
4.4.3 Traffic Flow Modelling  
The model and framework could be improved by incorporating the assessment of 
alternative paths in the calculation of optimal travel paths. This would give a more 
accurate analysis of the network as a whole, as these alternative paths may provide 
quicker travel times and there by increased network resilience.  
The use of traffic flow modelling methods was considered for use in this paper, but 
was deemed unnecessary for a number of reasons. Firstly, due to the defect data 
collected being available for only the recovery period of the event, the functionality of 
all network links was restored to a minimum performance level of 69% (Link 4-8) 
prior to the point in recovery at which the analysis was undertaken, with the majority 
of links greater than this. Due to the level of service available, traffic models which 
consider alternative routes due to link friction, or reduced performance, would not 
provide any alternative routes from those already determined.  
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Figure 4.4 - Updated WWRN with links redundant to CSG Development Traffic Removed 
Secondly, as shown in figure 3.6, the network analysed is simple, meaning the 
possibility and opportunity for alternative routes is limited to the paths between 
nodes 4 and 6. While a traffic flow analysis may indicate a traffic flow redistribution 
between these links, the high level of network performance restored at the end of the 
betterment recovery period means this is unlikely.  
Modelling of traffic flow distribution is likely to yield significant results only during the 
Emergent recovery period where significant and dangerous defects in the network 
exist. In order to analyse this more data would be required for the Emergent recovery 
period than was available for the purposes of this project. The cumulative effect of 
any financial impacts calculated in this period is also likely to be less significant than 
that calculated for the recovery period, due to the short duration of the emergent 
period. However, analysis of this aspect of the flood event disruption is necessary in 
order to provide a comprehensive assessment of network performance over the 
entire period of the event.  
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4.4.4 Data Quality  
There were a number of gaps in the 2011 Flood Damage Data available which did 
not become apparent until the analysis was undertaken. A significant gap that would 
assist in delivery of better analysis is greater record keeping of hazards restored 
during the Emergent works period, and the timeframes these works were delivered 
in. The hazards restored during this works period are the most hazardous and 
disruptive to network function, hence the need to restore these immediately. Due to 
the severity of these defects, the effect on link performance during these hazards is 
likely to be significant, and yield valuable findings on the efficiency of the work 
undertaken during the emergent works period. However, given that the links were 
restored to a minimum 69% performance (Link 4-8) following the Emergent work 
period, the works undertaken can be assumed to be efficient and effective at 
restoring the network to a satisfactory level of performance.  
Another minor flaw in the data collected, is that the hazards and defects recorded 
were recorded with the purpose of application for external funding for restoration, 
and not for the analysis of network performance and resilience. Due to this it is 
inferred that were the work required to restore a hazard was not of significant cost, 
this hazard was not collected and instead was restored during WDRC routine 
maintenance. An example of this encountered during analysis was the higher level of 
travel time resilience recorded on formation only roads, as opposed to pavement 
only roads. As discussed in the literature review of this paper, formation only roads 
are much more susceptible to wet weather damage than pavement only roads, and 
as such would be expected to suffer a much higher degree of damage in an extreme 
event such as that modelled. However, as the cost to restore a formation only road is 
much lower than the cost to restore a pavement only road (approximately $4.5 per 
lineal meter as opposed to $50 per lineal meter) the damage to these roads was 
likely not collected. This is shown in the defects recorded for Perretts Rd, which 
consisted only of areas requiring gravel resheeting, and did not include any 
maintenance grading.  
In order to ensure the suitability of collected data, the purpose of the data collection 
should be established prior to undertaking the collection. This was done when 
collecting the data used for this analysis, however the purpose was to secure 
external funding to repair damage to the road network. This data has been used in 
 121 
 
the analysis of network resilience, but as this is not the purpose for which the data 
was collected there are imperfections in the data which have effected the integrity of 
the analysis, such as the discrepancy on formation only roads discussed earlier. 
Ideally, the data would be collected with the purpose of analysing network resilience 
in mind, ensuring all hazards, no matter how minor or inexpensive to repair, would 
be collected and a true representation of the decreased performance of the network 
collected.  
4.4.5 CSG Developer Data 
The addition of data provided by QGC for this analysis would greatly improve the 
real world applications of this assessment. As the only data provided was that 
available to WDRC, traffic histograms and design files, certain assumptions were 
made regarding plant and labour costs. Should accurate information be provided, the 
analysis would be a closer representation of actual network conditions and costs 
expected to be incurred. In addition to this, an aspect not considered is the lost 
profits or potential losses due to delayed project delivery. This data would be 
required to be provided by QGC as no means of estimating these values is available 
to the student. The inclusion of these potential losses in the analysis would provide a 
more accurate representation of current network vulnerability in regards to CSG 
development.  
4.5 ANALYSIS APPLICATIONS AND USES 
Given the limitations of the framework discussed above and the restricted scope of 
the analysis undertaken, the intended use of the analysis as supporting justification 
for funding applications of network upgrades is limited. Should the recommended 
changes above be implemented the analysis would provide a thorough and practical 
representation of the benefits and savings of proposed upgrades to the road 
network.  
In addition to analysing the cost of decreased network performance during flood 
events, the framework could be applied to network disruptions of other natures, such 
as roadworks or traffic accidents. This could also be applied to analysis of speed 
zones or other design standards to determine the advantages offered by the 
construction of a higher asset class.  
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5  CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate methods of assessing and quantifying 
the resilience of a rural road infrastructure network, assess the resilience of an 
existing network on CSG development in the region, analyse the impact a series of 
proposed upgrades will have on this level of resilience, and draw conclusions as to 
the potential savings of these upgrades against the estimated upgrade cost. This 
was achieved for the Wandoan West Road Network area in the Western Downs 
Regional Council using historic damage information collected during and after the 
2011 Flood Event. The defect information was applied to the network using the NIRA 
Framework (Omer, et al., 2013) and the impacts on network performance assessed. 
The initial assessment identified Cecils Rd between Bundi Rd and Ryals Road (link 
4-8) as the link with the greatest susceptibility to increased travel cost, with a 
calculated additional cost per day of $2406.37. Link 6-8 was second most vulnerable 
with an estimated increased travel cost per day of $787.08, and Link 1-2 third with an 
increased travel cost of $734.01 per day. 
A series of currently proposed upgrades were then modelled to evaluate the 
potential increases to resilience due to these upgrades. The impacts of these were 
modelled in reducing the severity of the hazards recorded, which directly correlates 
to network performance.  
These upgrades greatly increased the performance of the network during the flood 
event, to differing extents dependant on the link and the nature of the proposed 
upgrade. The most significant savings were shown on the most vulnerable links, as 
these links had the most significant upgrade due to the vulnerability being intuitively 
recognised by WDRC Engineering staff. Following upgrade a total network cost 
saving of $2927 per day was identified, which extrapolated of the full recovery 
duration of the event, results in a cost saving of $809,519.  
Compared to an estimated construction cost of $4.1 Million, this saving does not 
greatly endorse the upgrade of these roads as a means of increasing resilience 
alone. However, these upgrades provide a slew of other benefits to road users and 
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CSG developers, including decreased travel time and wear on plant, increased 
safety for road users, and greater reliability and service. These other factors are 
difficult to quantify, but obviously proved compelling enough to undertake these 
upgrades as they are currently planned for construction. The cost savings due to 
flood resilience would only strengthen the proposal for these works.    
5.2 DEDUCTIONS FROM FINDINGS 
It is apparent from the analysis undertaken that the long term damage sustained by 
the Wandoan West Road Network during a flood event of 2011 Event magnitude has 
the capacity to cause significant financial loss to QGC developments in the area.  
5.2.1 Vulnerable Link Characteristics 
On examination of the Cost Resilience results per link obtained, it is apparent that 
the vulnerability of a link to financial loss is a direct result of the travel time resilience 
of the link, or the physical resilience to damage, and the traffic volume of the link. 
This is a fact intuitively known by local government engineers in constructing roads 
of a higher hierarchy to a higher standard.   
The identification of these most vulnerable links will allow local government or 
governing bodies to best identify the sections of the network with the greatest 
potential value for upgrade. This was demonstrated in the analysis of the proposed 
upgraded network, in which a total saving of $809,519 for the entire network was 
calculated, of this saving $617,935 was due to the upgrade of links 1-2 and 4-8, or 
76% of the total saving. This shows greater potential for value in upgrading of the 
most vulnerable links only.  
Also identified in the cost savings due to upgrades, was that the most significant 
increases in resilience were noted on links where the upgrades were to a higher 
asset class, rather than reconstruction or rehabilitation to the existing class. It can be 
inferred that this is because upgrade to a higher asset class provides greater 
resistance to wet weather, where if the asset class were to remain as existing, the 
existing vulnerabilities are retained.  
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5.2.2 Enhancement of Network Resilience 
Finally, the cost-benefit comparison of the proposed upgrades shows that the 
construction cost of the proposed upgrades far outweighs the cost savings during the 
flood event, and because of this the greatest and most cost effective opportunity for 
increased resilience is decreasing the time to recovery, including prioritisation of 
restoration of the most vulnerable links. As cost due to disruptions accrue linearly 
while defects are present, logically, decreasing the duration for which the network is 
effected by those defects translates directly to cost savings.  
5.3 FUTURE WORK 
From the analysis and research undertaken, areas of future improvement have been 
identified. 
5.3.1 Development of Dynamic Framework 
The NIRA framework was appropriate for providing an analysis of the network 
resilience at a single point in time. In order to increase the usefulness of the analysis, 
the analysis should be modified to assess network performance over the duration of 
an event. This would mean performing the analysis as done in this paper, but 
introducing the hazards not only in a physical location, but also a temporal location, 
meaning each hazard is assigned a duration and timeframe by which it affects 
network performance. This would better integrate the analysis performed in which 
cumulative costs are calculated, and total resilience expressed.  
In consideration of a truly dynamic framework, if a network of greater traffic volume 
and higher complexity was to be analysed, consideration should be given to 
modelling traffic distribution across the links to account for redistribution of traffic flow 
due to link disruptions. This was unnecessary for the analysis undertaken by this 
paper, but would be vital to obtain the true resilience of a network of greater 
complexity.  
5.3.2 Procedures for Data Collection 
To avoid skewing results due to gaps or errors in the collected data, a procedure 
would be required in order to properly assess the quantity and characteristics of 
defects present in the road network to be analysed. This procedure would clearly 
outline criteria to better identify hazards which require collection, and the properties 
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to be recorded. The properties to be recorded would be similar to those used for the 
analysis undertaken in this paper, but stricter criteria would be required in order to 
ensure that all defects are recorded irrespective of the cost to repair and whether or 
not additional funding is required.  
5.3.3 Standardised Hazard Impact Analysis 
The hazard impact analysis, or the determination of the impact each individual 
hazard will have on the performance of the network, is a core component to 
determining the level of resilience indicated by those hazards. For the purposes of 
this analysis, and as there was no standardised method available, this was purely 
subjective based on the student’s experience. Quite obviously this is not ideal as 
different operators will record different results. 
In order to correct this a standardised method of analysing the speed reduction 
required per hazard is necessary. This requires further research, but potentially 
could be expressed as a function of road roughness, or defect dimensions. If so 
these characteristics would then be included in the criteria for data collection 
discussed above.  
5.3.4 Concluding Statements 
In summary, the framework selected and methods of analysis used in this paper 
were suitable for the low volume and simple network being analysed. The analysis 
undertaken provides a useful summary of a network’s performance, and the current 
vulnerabilities of the network. While the analysis needs further refining in order to be 
successfully used as supporting justification for additional expenditure, the results 
obtained and vulnerabilities shown provide a useful tool for the analysis of network 
weaknesses. This provides focus to network administrators in identification of the 
network vulnerabilities and areas requiring investigation. 
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APPENDIX 6 – 1ST ITERATION ANALYSIS EXISTING NETWORK 
Link Properties Hazard Input Resilience Characteristics 
Link 
ID 
l S_Opt t_Opt V_BE LRF t_Est V_AE 
Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Dist 
Effective 
Dist 
Speed 
Reduction 
HRF ttBE ttAE CostBE CostAE R_CostLink R_TimeLink 
W-1 12 90 0.133 419 1.00 0.133 419             55.87 55.87  $  9,218.00   $  9,218.00   $               -    1.00 
1-2 5 90 0.056 419 0.84 0.066 419 0.1 0.105 0.005 0.205 40 0.018 23.28 27.73  $  3,840.83   $  4,574.84   $     734.01  0.84 
1-2 5 90 0.056 419 0.84 0.066 419 1 1.2 0.2 0.4 40 0.036 23.28 27.73  $  3,840.83   $  4,574.84   $     734.01  0.84 
1-2 5 90 0.056 419 0.84 0.066 419 1.2 1.2 0 0.2 30 0.013 23.28 27.73  $  3,840.83   $  4,574.84   $     734.01  0.84 
1-2 5 90 0.056 419 0.84 0.066 419 1.52 1.52 0 0.2 60 0.027 23.28 27.73  $  3,840.83   $  4,574.84   $     734.01  0.84 
1-2 5 90 0.056 419 0.84 0.066 419 3 3.05 0.05 0.25 40 0.022 23.28 27.73  $  3,840.83   $  4,574.84   $     734.01  0.84 
1-2 5 90 0.056 419 0.84 0.066 419 4.1 4.4 0.3 0.5 40 0.044 23.28 27.73  $  3,840.83   $  4,574.84   $     734.01  0.84 
2-3 6.8 90 0.076 419 0.97 0.078 419 10.4 10.5 0.1 0.3 40 0.020 31.66 32.51  $  5,223.53   $  5,363.76   $     140.23  0.97 
2-3 6.8 90 0.076 419 0.97 0.078 419 11 11 0 0.2 20 0.007 31.66 32.51  $  5,223.53   $  5,363.76   $     140.23  0.97 
3-4 5.17 90 0.057 419 0.98 0.059 419 14.55 14.6 0.05 0.25 40 0.021 24.07 24.60  $  3,971.42   $  4,058.65   $        87.23  0.98 
4-C 7.44 90 0.083 285 0.99 0.084 285 22.1 22.1 0 0.2 40 0.012 23.56 23.84  $  3,887.40   $  3,934.41   $        47.01  0.99 
5-C 6.3 90 0.070 158 0.95 0.074 158 26.3 26.4 0.1 0.3 40 0.021 11.06 11.63  $  1,824.90   $  1,919.70   $        94.80  0.95 
5-C 6.3 90 0.070 158 0.95 0.074 158 27.5 27.5 0 0.2 40 0.014 11.06 11.63  $  1,824.90   $  1,919.70   $        94.80  0.95 
5-C 6.3 90 0.070 158 0.95 0.074 158 29.4 29.4 0 0.2 40 0.014 11.06 11.63  $  1,824.90   $  1,919.70   $        94.80  0.95 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 1.3 1.35 0.05 0.25 30 0.016 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 1.55 1.6 0.05 0.25 30 0.016 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 1.61 1.65 0.04 0.24 30 0.015 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 1.7 1.75 0.05 0.25 30 0.016 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 1.8 1.85 0.05 0.25 30 0.016 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 2.1 2.15 0.05 0.25 30 0.016 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 2.2 2.3 0.1 0.3 30 0.019 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
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4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 2.4 2.45 0.05 0.25 30 0.016 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 2.55 2.59 0.04 0.24 30 0.015 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 2.6 2.64 0.04 0.24 30 0.015 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 2.65 2.8 0.15 0.35 30 0.022 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 3.35 3.4 0.05 0.25 30 0.016 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 3.5 3.55 0.05 0.25 30 0.016 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 3.65 3.7 0.05 0.25 30 0.016 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 4.1 4.15 0.05 0.25 30 0.016 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 5.15 5.2 0.05 0.25 30 0.016 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 5.8 5.85 0.05 0.25 30 0.016 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 6.05 6.1 0.05 0.25 30 0.016 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.69 0.140 339 6.2 6.25 0.05 0.25 30 0.016 32.93 47.52  $  5,433.69   $  7,840.06   $  2,406.37  0.69 
8-9 1.12 70 0.016 98 0.80 0.020 98 6.98 7 0.02 0.22 30 0.084 1.57 1.96  $     258.72   $     322.99   $        64.27  0.80 
8-9 1.12 70 0.016 98 0.80 0.020 98 7.1 7.2 0.1 0.3 30 0.115 1.57 1.96  $     258.72   $     322.99   $        64.27  0.80 
6-7 2.3 70 0.033 73 0.78 0.042 73 17.4 17.4 0 0.2 40 0.050 2.40 3.06  $     395.76   $     505.70   $     109.93  0.78 
6-7 2.3 70 0.033 73 0.78 0.042 73 17.6 17.7 0.1 0.3 40 0.075 2.40 3.06  $     395.76   $     505.70   $     109.93  0.78 
6-7 2.3 70 0.033 73 0.78 0.042 73 17.4 17.7 0.3 0.5 30 0.093 2.40 3.06  $     395.76   $     505.70   $     109.93  0.78 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 0.7 0.9 0.2 0.4 50 0.027 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $     165.81  0.89 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 3.7 3.8 0.1 0.3 30 0.012 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $     165.81  0.89 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 10.6 10.8 0.2 0.4 30 0.016 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $     165.81  0.89 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 11.7 11.8 0.1 0.3 20 0.008 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $     165.81  0.89 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 12 12.05 0.05 0.25 30 0.010 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $     165.81  0.89 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 12.3 12.4 0.1 0.3 30 0.012 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $     165.81  0.89 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 19.5 19.6 0.1 0.3 30 0.012 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $     165.81  0.89 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 20.8 20.8 0 0.2 50 0.014 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $     165.81  0.89 
7-D 4.3 70 0.061 53 0.79 0.077 53 15.8 16.3 0.5 0.7 50 0.116 3.26 4.10  $     537.19   $     676.55   $     139.36  0.79 
7-D 4.3 70 0.061 53 0.79 0.077 53 15.8 16.3 0.5 0.7 30 0.070 3.26 4.10  $     537.19   $     676.55   $     139.36  0.79 
7-D 4.3 70 0.061 53 0.79 0.077 53 16.7 16.7 0 0.2 30 0.020 3.26 4.10  $     537.19   $     676.55   $     139.36  0.79 
7-B 6.3 70 0.090 73 0.89 0.101 73 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.3 30 0.020 6.57 7.40  $  1,084.05   $  1,221.11   $     137.06  0.89 
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7-B 6.3 70 0.090 73 0.89 0.101 73 2.4 2.5 0.1 0.3 30 0.020 6.57 7.40  $  1,084.05   $  1,221.11   $     137.06  0.89 
7-B 6.3 70 0.090 73 0.89 0.101 73 2.8 2.9 0.1 0.3 30 0.020 6.57 7.40  $  1,084.05   $  1,221.11   $     137.06  0.89 
7-B 6.3 70 0.090 73 0.89 0.101 73 3.7 3.75 0.05 0.25 30 0.017 6.57 7.40  $  1,084.05   $  1,221.11   $     137.06  0.89 
7-B 6.3 70 0.090 73 0.89 0.101 73 5.2 5.25 0.05 0.25 30 0.017 6.57 7.40  $  1,084.05   $  1,221.11   $     137.06  0.89 
7-B 6.3 70 0.090 73 0.89 0.101 73 5.9 5.95 0.05 0.25 30 0.017 6.57 7.40  $  1,084.05   $  1,221.11   $     137.06  0.89 
6-8 10.43 70 0.149 339 0.91 0.163 339 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 30 0.012 50.51 55.28  $  8,334.32   $  9,121.40   $     787.08  0.91 
6-8 10.43 70 0.149 339 0.91 0.163 339 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.3 30 0.012 50.51 55.28  $  8,334.32   $  9,121.40   $     787.08  0.91 
6-8 10.43 70 0.149 339 0.91 0.163 339 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.3 30 0.012 50.51 55.28  $  8,334.32   $  9,121.40   $     787.08  0.91 
6-8 10.43 70 0.149 339 0.91 0.163 339 2.3 2.4 0.1 0.3 30 0.012 50.51 55.28  $  8,334.32   $  9,121.40   $     787.08  0.91 
6-8 10.43 70 0.149 339 0.91 0.163 339 2.9 3.1 0.2 0.4 30 0.016 50.51 55.28  $  8,334.32   $  9,121.40   $     787.08  0.91 
6-8 10.43 70 0.149 339 0.91 0.163 339 9.2 9.25 0.05 0.25 30 0.010 50.51 55.28  $  8,334.32   $  9,121.40   $     787.08  0.91 
6-8 10.43 70 0.149 339 0.91 0.163 339 10 10.05 0.05 0.25 30 0.010 50.51 55.28  $  8,334.32   $  9,121.40   $     787.08  0.91 
9-A 5.8 70 0.083 98 1.00 0.083 98           0.000 8.12 8.12  $  1,339.80   $  1,339.80   $               -    1.00 
9-10 3.5 90 0.039 44 1.00 0.039 44           0.000 1.71 1.71  $     282.33   $     282.33   $               -    1.00 
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7 APPENDIX 7 – TABLE OF OMISSIONS AND VARIATIONS TO EXISTING HAZARDS DUE TO PLANNED 
ROAD UPGRADES 
W-1 
Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Description 
Speed 
Reduction 
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor 
Comments 
          No Hazards Recorded 
1-2 
Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Description 
Speed 
Reduction 
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor 
Comments 
0.1 0.105 Shoulder washed away from edge of bitumen 20 0.005 
Full Road Reconstruction undertaken in this area with widening 
of seal and improved drainage profile. These hazards may still 
occur in extreme events but have been reduced in severity to 
reflect the lessened likelihood of this occuring 
1 1.2 Shoulder washed away from edge of bitumen 20 0.053 
1.2 1.2 Scouring off end of pipe 20 0.053 
1.52 1.52 Pipe washed out - has been fixed 20 0.068 
3 3.05 Shoulder washed away from edge of bitumen 20 0.136 
4.1 4.4 Scouring on edge of bitumen 20 0.196 
2-3 
Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Description 
Speed 
Reduction 
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor 
Comments 
10.4 10.5 Scour to Pavement 20 0.010   
11 11 Scour to Floodway Slab 0 0.000 
Removed due to full floodway replacement as part of planned 
upgrade 
3-4 
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Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Description 
Speed 
Reduction 
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor 
Comments 
14.55 14.6 Scour to Pavement 20 0.011 Reduced due to full width reconstruction 
            
4-C 
Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Description 
Speed 
Reduction 
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor 
Comments 
22.1 22.1 Scour to Pavement 10 0.004 Reduced due to planned full width reconstruction in this area. 
5-C 
Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Description 
Speed 
Reduction 
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor 
Comments 
26.3 26.4 Scour to Pavement 10 0.005 
Reduced due to full width reconstruction in this section 27.5 27.5 Scouring Edge of Bitumen 10 0.004 
29.4 29.4 Scouring Edge of Bitumen 10 0.004 
4-8 
Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Description 
Speed 
Reduction 
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor 
Comments 
1.3 1.35 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
Scouring of gravel significantly reduced due to sealing of road. 
Hazards only lessened not eliminated as scouring of pavement is 
likely to be replaced by scouring of the road shoulder 
1.55 1.6 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
1.61 1.65 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
1.7 1.75 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
1.8 1.85 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
2.1 2.15 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
2.2 2.3 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.005 
2.4 2.45 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
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2.55 2.59 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
2.6 2.64 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
2.65 2.8 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.006 
3.35 3.4 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
3.5 3.55 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
3.65 3.7 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
4.1 4.15 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
5.15 5.2 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
5.8 5.85 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
6.05 6.1 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
6.2 6.25 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 10 0.004 
8-9 
Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Description 
Speed 
Reduction 
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor 
Comments 
6.98 7 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 30 0.084 No upgrade planned. Hazards as per previous analysis 
7.1 7.2 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 30 0.115 
6-7 
Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Description 
Speed 
Reduction 
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor 
Comments 
17.4 17.4 Scouriing of invert 30 0.037 
Hazards reduced slightly. Planned verticle alignment upgrade 
should reduce scour, but not eliminate completely 17.6 17.7 Scouriing of invert 
30 0.056 
17.4 17.7 Scouring out edge of pavement 20 0.062 
5-6 
Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Description 
Speed 
Reduction 
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor 
Comments 
0.7 0.9 Washout of Road 50 0.027 No upgrades planned. As per original analysis 
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3.7 3.8 Scouring of invert 30 0.012 
10.6 10.8 Scouring of invert   30 0.016 
11.7 11.8 Scouring out edge of pavement   20 0.008 
12 12.05 Scouirng of invert   30 0.010 
12.3 12.4 Scouring of invert   30 0.012 
19.5 19.6 Scouring of Pavement 30 0.012 
20.8 20.8 Silt Buildup 50 0.014 
7-D 
Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Description 
Speed 
Reduction 
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor 
Comments 
15.8 16.3 Washout of Road 50 0.116 
No upgrades planned. As per original analysis 15.8 16.3 Scouring of invert 30 0.070 
16.7 16.7 Scouring of Pavement 30 0.020 
7-B 
Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Description 
Speed 
Reduction 
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor 
Comments 
0.7 0.8 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 20 0.014 Hazards reduced slightly. Planned verticle alignment upgrade 
should reduce scour, but not eliminate completely 
2.4 2.5 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 20 0.014 
2.8 2.9 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 20 0.014 
3.7 3.75 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 20 0.011 
5.2 5.25 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 20 0.011 
5.9 5.95 Gravel Scouring and Rutting 20 0.011 
6-8 
Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Description 
Speed 
Reduction 
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor 
Comments 
0.3 0.4 
Pavement inundation resulting in gravel scouring and 
rutting   20 0.011 
Reduced slightly due to gravel upgrade. Upgrade will not 
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0.5 0.6 Scouring of floodway   20 0.016 eliminate hazards completely. 
0.8 0.9 
Pavement inundation resulting in gravel scouring and 
rutting   20 0.025 
2.3 2.4 
Pavement inundation resulting in gravel scouring and 
rutting   20 0.066 
2.9 3.1 
Pavement inundation resulting in gravel scouring and 
rutting   20 0.085 
9.2 9.25 Scouring of floodway   0 0.000 Floodway upgrade to causeway expected to eliminate hazards 
10 10.05 Deposits of silt & debris on floodway   0 0.000 
9-A 
Ch. 
St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Description 
Speed 
Reduction 
Hazard 
Reduction 
Factor 
Comments 
        0.000 No hazards recorded 
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APPENDIX 8 – 2ND ITERATION NETWORK ANALYSIS POST UPGRADE 
Link Properties Hazard Input Resilience Characteristics 
Link ID l S_Opt t_Opt V_BE LRF t_Est V_AE Ch. St. 
Ch. 
Fn. 
Dist Effective Dist 
Speed 
Reduction 
HRF ttBE ttAE CostBE CostAE R_CostLink R_TimeLink 
W-1 12 90 0.133 419 1.00 0.133 419             55.87 55.87  $  9,218.00   $  9,218.00   $              -    1.00 
1-2 5 90 0.056 419 0.92 0.060 419 0.1 0.105 0.005 0.205 20 0.009 23.28 25.25  $  3,840.83   $  4,165.76   $    324.93  0.92 
1-2 5 90 0.056 419 0.92 0.060 419 1 1.2 0.2 0.4 20 0.018 23.28 25.25  $  3,840.83   $  4,165.76   $    324.93  0.92 
1-2 5 90 0.056 419 0.92 0.060 419 1.2 1.2 0 0.2 20 0.009 23.28 25.25  $  3,840.83   $  4,165.76   $    324.93  0.92 
1-2 5 90 0.056 419 0.92 0.060 419 1.52 1.52 0 0.2 20 0.009 23.28 25.25  $  3,840.83   $  4,165.76   $    324.93  0.92 
1-2 5 90 0.056 419 0.92 0.060 419 3 3.05 0.05 0.25 20 0.011 23.28 25.25  $  3,840.83   $  4,165.76   $    324.93  0.92 
1-2 5 90 0.056 419 0.92 0.060 419 4.1 4.4 0.3 0.5 20 0.022 23.28 25.25  $  3,840.83   $  4,165.76   $    324.93  0.92 
2-3 6.8 90 0.076 419 0.99 0.076 419 10.4 10.5 0.1 0.3 20 0.010 31.66 31.97  $  5,223.53   $  5,275.25   $       51.72  0.99 
2-3 6.8 90 0.076 419 0.99 0.076 419 11 11 0 0.2 0 0.000 31.66 31.97  $  5,223.53   $  5,275.25   $       51.72  0.99 
3-4 5.17 90 0.057 419 0.99 0.058 419 14.55 14.6 0.05 0.25 20 0.011 24.07 24.33  $  3,971.42   $  4,014.56   $       43.14  0.99 
4-C 7.44 90 0.083 285 1.00 0.083 285 22.1 22.1 0 0.2 10 0.003 23.56 23.63  $  3,887.40   $  3,899.05   $       11.65  1.00 
5-C 6.3 90 0.070 158 0.99 0.071 158 26.3 26.4 0.1 0.3 10 0.005 11.06 11.20  $  1,824.90   $  1,847.71   $       22.81  0.99 
5-C 6.3 90 0.070 158 0.99 0.071 158 27.5 27.5 0 0.2 10 0.004 11.06 11.20  $  1,824.90   $  1,847.71   $       22.81  0.99 
5-C 6.3 90 0.070 158 0.99 0.071 158 29.4 29.4 0 0.2 10 0.004 11.06 11.20  $  1,824.90   $  1,847.71   $       22.81  0.99 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 1.3 1.35 0.05 0.25 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 1.55 1.6 0.05 0.25 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 1.61 1.65 0.04 0.24 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 1.7 1.75 0.05 0.25 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 1.8 1.85 0.05 0.25 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 2.1 2.15 0.05 0.25 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 2.2 2.3 0.1 0.3 10 0.006 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 2.4 2.45 0.05 0.25 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 2.55 2.59 0.04 0.24 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 2.6 2.64 0.04 0.24 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 2.65 2.8 0.15 0.35 10 0.007 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
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4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 3.35 3.4 0.05 0.25 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 3.5 3.55 0.05 0.25 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 3.65 3.7 0.05 0.25 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 4.1 4.15 0.05 0.25 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 5.15 5.2 0.05 0.25 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 5.8 5.85 0.05 0.25 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 6.05 6.1 0.05 0.25 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
4-8 6.8 70 0.097 339 0.90 0.108 339 6.2 6.25 0.05 0.25 10 0.005 32.93 36.68  $  5,433.69   $  6,052.97   $    619.29  0.90 
8-9 1.12 70 0.016 98 0.80 0.020 98 6.98 7 0.02 0.22 30 0.084 1.57 1.96  $     258.72   $     322.99   $       64.27  0.80 
8-9 1.12 70 0.016 98 0.80 0.020 98 7.1 7.2 0.1 0.3 30 0.115 1.57 1.96  $     258.72   $     322.99   $       64.27  0.80 
6-7 2.3 70 0.033 73 0.84 0.039 73 17.4 17.4 0 0.2 30 0.037 2.40 2.84  $     395.76   $     468.52   $       72.75  0.84 
6-7 2.3 70 0.033 73 0.84 0.039 73 17.6 17.7 0.1 0.3 30 0.056 2.40 2.84  $     395.76   $     468.52   $       72.75  0.84 
6-7 2.3 70 0.033 73 0.84 0.039 73 17.4 17.7 0.3 0.5 20 0.062 2.40 2.84  $     395.76   $     468.52   $       72.75  0.84 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 0.7 0.9 0.2 0.4 50 0.027 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $    165.81  0.89 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 3.7 3.8 0.1 0.3 30 0.012 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $    165.81  0.89 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 10.6 10.8 0.2 0.4 30 0.016 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $    165.81  0.89 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 11.7 11.8 0.1 0.3 20 0.008 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $    165.81  0.89 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 12 12.05 0.05 0.25 30 0.010 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $    165.81  0.89 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 12.3 12.4 0.1 0.3 30 0.012 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $    165.81  0.89 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 19.5 19.6 0.1 0.3 30 0.012 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $    165.81  0.89 
5-6 10.52 70 0.150 53 0.89 0.169 53 20.8 20.8 0 0.2 50 0.014 7.97 8.97  $  1,314.25   $  1,480.06   $    165.81  0.89 
7-D 4.3 70 0.061 53 0.79 0.077 53 15.8 16.3 0.5 0.7 50 0.116 3.26 4.10  $     537.19   $     676.55   $    139.36  0.79 
7-D 4.3 70 0.061 53 0.79 0.077 53 15.8 16.3 0.5 0.7 30 0.070 3.26 4.10  $     537.19   $     676.55   $    139.36  0.79 
7-D 4.3 70 0.061 53 0.79 0.077 53 16.7 16.7 0 0.2 30 0.020 3.26 4.10  $     537.19   $     676.55   $    139.36  0.79 
7-B 6.3 70 0.090 73 0.93 0.097 73 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.3 20 0.014 6.57 7.10  $  1,084.05   $  1,171.73   $       87.68  0.93 
7-B 6.3 70 0.090 73 0.93 0.097 73 2.4 2.5 0.1 0.3 20 0.014 6.57 7.10  $  1,084.05   $  1,171.73   $       87.68  0.93 
7-B 6.3 70 0.090 73 0.93 0.097 73 2.8 2.9 0.1 0.3 20 0.014 6.57 7.10  $  1,084.05   $  1,171.73   $       87.68  0.93 
7-B 6.3 70 0.090 73 0.93 0.097 73 3.7 3.75 0.05 0.25 20 0.011 6.57 7.10  $  1,084.05   $  1,171.73   $       87.68  0.93 
7-B 6.3 70 0.090 73 0.93 0.097 73 5.2 5.25 0.05 0.25 20 0.011 6.57 7.10  $  1,084.05   $  1,171.73   $       87.68  0.93 
7-B 6.3 70 0.090 73 0.93 0.097 73 5.9 5.95 0.05 0.25 20 0.011 6.57 7.10  $  1,084.05   $  1,171.73   $       87.68  0.93 
6-8 10.43 70 0.149 339 0.96 0.156 339 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 20 0.008 50.51 52.83  $  8,334.32   $  8,716.35   $    382.03  0.96 
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6-8 10.43 70 0.149 339 0.96 0.156 339 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.3 20 0.008 50.51 52.83  $  8,334.32   $  8,716.35   $    382.03  0.96 
6-8 10.43 70 0.149 339 0.96 0.156 339 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.3 20 0.008 50.51 52.83  $  8,334.32   $  8,716.35   $    382.03  0.96 
6-8 10.43 70 0.149 339 0.96 0.156 339 2.3 2.4 0.1 0.3 20 0.008 50.51 52.83  $  8,334.32   $  8,716.35   $    382.03  0.96 
6-8 10.43 70 0.149 339 0.96 0.156 339 2.9 3.1 0.2 0.4 20 0.011 50.51 52.83  $  8,334.32   $  8,716.35   $    382.03  0.96 
6-8 10.43 70 0.149 339 0.96 0.156 339 9.2 9.25 0.05 0.25 0 0.000 50.51 52.83  $  8,334.32   $  8,716.35   $    382.03  0.96 
6-8 10.43 70 0.149 339 0.96 0.156 339 10 10.05 0.05 0.25 0 0.000 50.51 52.83  $  8,334.32   $  8,716.35   $    382.03  0.96 
9-A 5.8 70 0.083 98 1.00 0.083 98           0.000 8.12 8.12  $  1,339.80   $  1,339.80   $              -    1.00 
9-10 3.5 90 0.039 44 1.00 0.039 44           0.000 1.71 1.71  $     282.33   $     282.33   $              -    1.00 
 
 149 
 
END 
